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The American mortgage market experienced  a burst of financial innovation 
between  1870 and  1890 when  several new  types of intermediaries  arose to 
facilitate the flow of mortgage credit from the Northeast and Europe to areas 
of  settlement in the South and West.'  But progress toward a fully integrated 
national mortgage market stalled when most of the new institutions failed dur- 
ing the mortgage crisis of the 1890s. The most important survivors were a few 
life insurance companies that had already become the nation's  largest interre- 
gional lenders. Other large life insurance companies established interregional 
lending operations  soon after  1900, and  the industry remained  the primary 
source of long-distance mortgage credit in the United States until the 1950s. 
This paper traces the historical process that brought life insurance companies 
to their position of  dominance in the interregional mortgage market and ex- 
plains why no other intermediary served the same function. 
In order to lend interregionally,  intermediaries had to employ loan agents 
who could make and enforce mortgage contracts in distant markets. But these 
agents also had to be monitored. A few insurance companies internalized the 
supervision of loan agents within elaborate branch office networks, but most 
contracted  with  other  firms,  called  mortgage  companies,  to  supervise loan 
agents for them. The life insurance-mortgage  company connection dominated 
the interregional mortgage market in the United States because other interme- 
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diaries either did not incorporate loan agents into their lending structures or 
failed when they attempted to do so. 
Local building associations, savings banks, and commercial banks did not 
use  loan  agents because  they  made  mortgages  only  in their  local  markets. 
Many of these institutions were prohibited from lending out of state, but regu- 
lation cannot explain why they all shunned the national mortgage market. I 
argue in section 7.2 that local lending agencies restricted their mortgage opera- 
tions to spatially concentrated markets because they were poorly designed to 
cope with the unique information imperfections associated with long-distance 
mortgage lending. To make the point I examine the notable exception: the “na- 
tional” building associations of the 1880s. These intermediaries extended the 
cooperative mortgage lending structure popularized by local building associa- 
tions to the interregional market, but nearly all of them had collapsed by  1900. 
Western farm mortgage companies  appeared in the  1870s specifically  to 
make and enforce loans for eastern and European  investors,  first by  simply 
brokering mortgages and later by issuing mortgage-backed  securities. These 
companies grew rapidly in number for more than a decade, but nearly all of 
them failed in the 1890s. In sections 7.3 and 7.4 I examine the rise and fall of 
the farm mortgage companies to characterize the complex contractual arrange- 
ments that were used in the interregional market. These contracts linked bor- 
rowers to loan agents, loan agents to intermediaries, and intermediaries to in- 
vestors.  All three types of  contracts can be rationalized as responses to the 
specific information asymmetries that arose in each of these bilateral relation- 
ships. A rapid increase in the supply of mortgage credit during the 1880s, how- 
ever, led to a breakdown of the incentives built into the contracts and generated 
an episode of “overlending.” So the fragility of interregional lending arrange- 
ments was responsible for the mortgage crisis of the 1890s and, as a result, the 
incomplete integration of the national mortgage market before 1900. 
Unlike other interregional  intermediaries, life insurance companies exter- 
nalized their loan agent networks by establishing relationships with indepen- 
dent mortgage companies. This structure also proved to be fragile, however, 
and actually became the driving force behind the farm mortgage boom of the 
1920s. In fact, the insurance companies came to dominate the national mort- 
gage market  not  because they were able to avoid bouts of overlending,  but 
because they were able to survive the subsequent mortgage crises. They did so 
by  establishing  internal monitoring  structures to enforce  outstanding  mort- 
gages and to manage foreclosed properties when their relationships with mort- 
gage companies broke down. This complex inside-outside lending structure 
was ideally suited to withstand the instability that was an inherent characteris- 
tic of the interregional mortgage market before 1950. These themes are drawn 
out in sections 7.5 and 7.6, where I examine the development of the life insur- 
ance-mortgage  company connection before  1900, its rapid expansion during 
the interwar period, and the collapse of this most durable interregional lending 
structure in the 1930s. 
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Fig. 7.1  Lending arrangements in the historical mortgage market 
gional mortgage market after World War I1 by establishing connections with a 
new generation of mortgage companies. This time, however, they concentrated 
on federally insured and guaranteed loans. In the conclusion I argue that these 
government  programs  ameliorated  the  informational  forces  which  had  pre- 
viously destabilized interregional lending structures, encouraged intermediar- 
ies other than insurance companies to lend over long distances, and led to an 
integration of the national mortgage market. 
In section 7.1 I characterize the information imperfections that are associ- 
ated with mortgage lending and discuss their influence on the costs of making 
and enforcing historical mortgage contracts. I also examine the role of “dele- 
gated monitors”-individuals  or institutions who made and enforced contracts 
for other investors. I use these insights in the rest of the paper to explain why 
several types  of  lending  arrangements were used  in the historical mortgage 
market and why so many interregional structures failed. Some of these insti- 
tutional arrangements  may be unfamiliar to readers, so all of the contractual 
relationships  that  are discussed  in  the paper are outlined schematically  in 
figure 7.1. 
7.1  Negotiation and Enforcement of Historical Mortgage Contracts 
Before  1930 American mortgage contracts differed from modern loans in 
several respects. They generally had maturities of only three to five years, were 212  Kenneth A. Snowden 
normally written for less than one-half of  the property value, and required the 
borrower to pay only interest while the loan was outstanding. The entire princi- 
pal  was due at maturity, but  it was common for the borrower  to  renew  the 
mortgage several times before extinguishing the debt.2  In this section I explain 
how  mortgage  debt was negotiated  and enforced  in the historical  mortgage 
market and why investors sometimes used a third party to perform these ser- 
vices for them. 
The owner of real estate realizes the returns from his investment by retaining 
ownership and earning a stream of income, or by selling the property for the 
present value of the income that it is expected to earn in the future. When the 
acquisition of property is externally financed, the outside investor must be paid 
from one or both of these sources. These arrangements are generally compli- 
cated by  two types of information asymmetries. First, the owner directly ob- 
serves information about the actual level of current returns, whereas the outside 
investor does not. Second, the owner can take unobserved  actions that affect 
the level of  current and future returns. “Hidden information” and “hidden ac- 
tion’’ problems have a profound influence on the contractual relationship be- 
tween owner and investor and are the reasons that real estate investments are 
generally financed with mortgage debt. 
To understand why, consider the problems of financing a real estate project 
with equity. Under this contract the owner might claim that the current return 
on the project was lower than its actual level and blame the poor performance 
on a bad “state of nature.” Since the announcement might be true, the investor 
would have to accept a smaller payment than her share of the actual return. 
Moreover, the owner might choose to increase current returns by overworking 
the property  and depreciating  its value,  opt to consume leisure  rather  than 
maintain the property’s physical condition, or even sell off portable property 
improvements-all  without  the  investor’s knowledge.  Any  of  these  actions 
would  lower the investor’s payment below its promised  level if the property 
were then sold. Under an equity contract, then, an uninformed  investor can 
protect her interests only by directly observing the project’s current return and 
the owner’s actions. Contracts like these are very costly to enforce, however, 
because the investor must continuously monitor the property owner. 
Mortgage-rather  than equity-contracts  have typically  been  used  to fi- 
nance real estate projects because they mitigate hidden information and action 
problems while generating relatively  low expected enforcement  costs.3 Such 
contracts stipulate a fixed payment of principal and interest which is indepen- 
dent  of  the  project’s current  return  or of  the  property’s  value.  Because the 
owner cannot affect the size of  the payment made to the investor by under- 
2. Snowden 1987 and 1988 provide detailed information about the lending terms that were used 
in the historical mortgage market. 
3. Much of the discussion in this paragraph is based on Townsend’s explanation (1979) of the 
optimality of debt when state verification is costly. Townsend’s analysis is restricted to the hidden 
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reporting the project’s current return, he has no incentive to do so. In particular, 
the owner is discouraged from declaring a “false”  default under a mortgage 
contract because the investor is then allowed to take possession of the property, 
sell it, and recover all principal, forgone interest,  and expenses. Because the 
owner knows that a false default only delays full repayment  and triggers  a 
“penalty” as well (the costs of foreclosure proceedings), he is better off simply 
honoring the contract when he can. In addition, a mortgagor has incentives to 
make and maintain improvements to his property because he holds the residual 
claim if it is sold. So the mortgage contract is costlessly self-enforcing so long 
as the owner chooses to retain possession of the property and earns sufficiently 
high returns to make the stipulated payments. 
If  the owner defaults, however, the investor must actively enforce a mort- 
gage, and the cost of  doing so depends on the reasons for the delinquency. 
Sometimes the owner would like to make the payments stipulated by the con- 
tract, but is unable to do so because current returns are too low. In this situation 
the investor must first confirm that a temporary problem exists, and then nor- 
mally seeks to reschedule the  payment^.^ The investor incurs only modest en- 
forcement costs during a “temporary” default, since she must only confirm that 
the owner continues to value his residual claim on the property. The problem 
is much more serious, and enforcement costs far greater, if the owner chooses 
to default because the market value of his property falls below the discounted 
value of  the remaining mortgage payments. In this case the owner’s residual 
claim on the property is worthless, and the investor already “owns” the entire 
project (less the foreclosure costs she must absorb to assume ownership). In 
these situations the hidden-information and -action problems also arise in full 
force because the owner has incentives to hide all of the project’s return, to 
make no interest  or property  tax payments,  and to sell off or depreciate all 
improvements. To protect her interests, therefore, the investor must  monitor 
the property owner carefully and at great cost when foreclosure is imminent. 
These elements of contract enforcement were clearly at work in the histori- 
cal mortgage market. Despite Populists’ claims to the contrary, investors con- 
sistently sought to accommodate mortgagors by  rescheduling mortgage pay- 
ments  when  they  defa~lted.~  In  fact,  most  states  required  mortgagees  to 
exercise this type of forgiveness during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
4.  Bagnoli and Snowden (1993) examine an environment in which the hidden-action problem 
becomes critical in the default state. They also provide historical evidence of the contingent nature 
of enforcement costs in the mortgage market during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
turies. 
5. An  interesting feature of the analysis in Bagnoli and Snowden 1993 is that the optimal se- 
cured debt contract calls for the investor to take all of the surplus under rescheduling, and leave 
the borrower at his reservation level of utility. The reason is that the original scheduled payment 
is minimized and, therefore, the expected cost of monitoring is lowest, when the investor’s return 
is maximized whenever costly default occurs. This helps to explain why investors in the nineteenth 
century consistently claimed that “we scek interest, not land,” while borrowers (and Populists) 
perceived that investors were trying to push them off  the land during negotiations subsequent 
to default. 214  Kenneth A. Snowden 
centuries. During statutory  “redemption” periods of one or two years, a de- 
faulter had the right to maintain possession  of  the land and to terminate the 
foreclosure proceeding at any time by paying all arrears (Skilton 1944). When 
all efforts to reschedule failed, however, the property owner was left to choose 
one  of  three  actions  (Bogue  1955; Woodruff  1937). Sometimes  he  simply 
abandoned the property and left the investor to initiate foreclosure proceed- 
ings. Alternatively, the owner deeded the land over to the lender for a nominal 
fee to avoid the costs and delays of foreclosure proceedings. The third response 
was worst from the investor’s viewpoint; the owner could choose to remain on 
the land during the redemption period so that the investor had to monitor the 
borrower and inspect the property until foreclosure proceedings had been com- 
pleted. 
No matter  how  ownership  changed  hands,  there  were  still  greater  costs 
ahead. The investor had to sell the property  to liquidate her investment, and 
the outlays associated with this activity were substantial (Mehr 1944; Wood- 
ruff  1937). Taxes had to be paid so that ownership did not pass to the local 
government.  If  the  property  was not  sold  through  the  court (the procedure 
when foreclosure was contested), advertising and selling costs had to be borne. 
More important, the property had to be managed and maintained  until it was 
sold. If the improvements had depreciated (during the redemption period, in 
anticipation of deeding the land, or as a result of abandonment), investments 
had to be made to bring the land back to salable condition. The investor would 
often lease the land to a tenant until a buyer could be found. While this ap- 
proach yielded income, it also required intensive monitoring to collect rental 
payments and to make sure that the tenant did not depreciate property improve- 
ments. Therefore, the investor would break even on a foreclosure only if  the 
sale of the property covered the original payments that she had been promised 
and the substantial expenses that were associated with seizing encumbered real 
estate and liquidating her investment. 
The important point is that the enforcement costs associated with mortgage 
lending varied across contingencies: they were negligible so long as the proj- 
ect’s current return  was sufficient to cover interest  charges and the property 
owner preferred to retain ownership; increased modestly if the borrower de- 
faulted because of  a transient shock to the return  stream; but rose to much 
higher  levels when  foreclosure became imminent. So expected enforcement 
costs under a historical mortgage contract depended critically on the probabil- 
ity of default and foreclosure. Investors were compensated for these costs by a 
premium that was stipulated in the contract when the mortgage was negotiated. 
The investor absorbed all “enforcement risk,” however, because  she did not 
know whether any particular loan would involve low or high enforcement cost 
when it was made. We shall see below that the allocation of enforcement risk 
played a critical role in all interregional lending arrangements. 
The theory of optimal contracting predicts that agents will choose the least- 
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enforcement costs under mortgages should have been lower than those under 
other types of contracts that could have been used to finance real estate invest- 
ments. In fact, to lower expected enforcement  costs investors used a rule of 
thumb in the historical market that may appear conservative when compared 
to modem practice-“the  principle of sound . . .  mortgage [lending] is that the 
loan shall not exceed one-half the value of the land even though [the property] 
be abandoned, the improvements destroyed, and the land reduced practically 
to its primitive state” (Robins 1916, 124). The idea, of course, was to avoid 
foreclosure  (and very high enforcement  costs) by  restricting  total debt pay- 
ments to a level well below the property’s current value. A serious problem 
with this  system, however, was that  the risk  of  foreclosure  was completely 
determined by the accuracy of the property appraisal which, in turn, depended 
heavily on the judgment, experience, and honesty of the person performing it 
(Hurd 1923, 197). The great danger was that the property might be overvalued 
during negotiation,  in which case its owner would have been  more likely to 
renege on the contract if property values declined during the life of the loan. 
I have spoken as if investors perform all negotiation and enforcement them- 
selves, and, in fact, most American mortgage loans were directly negotiated 
and enforced by investors until the early twentieth century. But I am interested 
here in explaining the development of more complex lending arrangements in 
which investors contracted  with third parties to negotiate  and enforce mort- 
gages for them. Financial intermediaries normally take up the role of the third 
party in loan transactions, and by 1900 savings banks and building associations 
had  become the nation’s most important sources of  intermediated  mortgage 
debt. But these institutions  operated only within  local markets.  All  interre- 
gional loans, on the other hand, were made through loan agents who negotiated 
and enforced the mortgage for a distant investor. Sometimes these individual 
agents would contract directly with an investor, but most interregional mort- 
gage credit passed through complex hierarchical  arrangements in which one 
or more financial institutions intermediated  the relationship between investor 
and loan agent. The goal of this paper is to explain why these complex forms 
of intermediation arose in the interregional market, and why so many of them 
failed. 
To  do so I appeal to a framework that has recently been used to show that 
intermediaries  act as “delegated monitors”  when they negotiate and enforce 
information-intensive loans.6 The critical insight of this new understanding of 
financial intermediation  is that a delegated  monitor  must have incentives to 
negotiate and enforce loans in the investor’s best interest. This requirement, 
which I refer to as credibility, stems from the fact that the intermediary, rather 
than the investor, observes the private information of the borrower. Unless its 
behavior is constrained, there are several ways that the intermediary could use 
6. Diamond 1984 and Williamson 1986 show why delegated monitors arise when loan contracts 
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this information advantage to raise its own payoffs at the expense of the inves- 
tor: by negotiating loans carelessly; by selecting high-risk, high-interest loans 
without informing the investor; or by falsely reporting loan defaults. It can be 
costly, however, to provide an intermediary with incentives not to engage in 
these behaviors. So the intermediary qualifies as a cost-effective and credible 
delegated monitor only if the information asymmetry between it and the inves- 
tor can be ameliorated without exhausting its relative cost advantage over in- 
vestors in the negotiation and enforcement of  loans.’ 
I argue below that the uneven and irregular development of the interregional 
mortgage market resulted from the difficulty of establishing lending structures 
within which loan agents could serve as delegated monitors. I will show that 
the primary determinant of  mortgage negotiation  and enforcement costs was 
proximity to the property owner-so  loan agents clearly enjoyed a cost advan- 
tage over distant investors. The vexing problem was to establish the agents’ 
credibility. In  sections 7.2 and 7.3 I argue that locally focused intermediaries 
and most individual investors found it prohibitively  costly to monitor distant 
loan agents, and so were shut out of the interregional market. Then I show that 
the intermediated lending structures that were specifically designed to incorpo- 
rate loan agents were inherently unstable. 
7.2  Intermediated Mortgage Lending within Local Markets 
In this section I consider intermediaries that restricted their mortgage lend- 
ing operations to local markets before 1900. The discussion provides historical 
evidence that proximity to the borrower was the critical determinant of the 
costs of mortgage negotiation and enforcement and that this constraint repre- 
sented  a particularly  troublesome  impediment  to the development of  inter- 
regional  intermediaries.  I  also  explain  why  intermediated  structures  that 
operated  successfully in local markets  did not  enter the  national  mortgage 
market. 
Two of these intermediaries, mutual savings banks and local building associ- 
ations, rank among the most successful American financial innovations of the 
nineteenth century. Mutual savings banks were introduced in a few northeast- 
em cities in the 18  10s and 1820s to serve as a repository for the savings of the 
working poor. Building associations, on the other hand, were first established 
in Philadelphia during the 1830s so that members could cooperatively finance 
7. In Diamond 1984, for example, the cost advantage of intermediation arises because individual 
investors must share loans in the absence of a delegated monitor because of a wealth constraint. 
No single investor can credibly promise to act as a faithful delegated monitor for the others, so 
each one must enforce the contract separately. He then uses the law of large numbers to show that 
the delegated monitor can charge borrowers an infinitesimal premium and drive to zero the proba- 
bility that the return on the loan portfolio will fall below the deposit liability. Since it is nearly 
impossible for the delegated monitor to actually default, he cannot falsely declare that he has. 217  The Evolution of Interregional Mortgage Lending Channels, 1870-1 940 
the purchase of homes. These institutions became so popular that by 1900 sav- 
ings banks were operating in seventeen  states and building associations had 
been organized in every state and more than two thousand cities (Lintner 1948, 
49; Rotella and Snowden 1992). Both institutions specialized in raising funds 
from small investors who could not have made mortgage  loans directly. In 
1890, for example, the average deposit in a savings bank was $355, and the 
average shareholding in a building association was $303, while home mort- 
gages ranged in average size from $900 in the North Central states to $1,600 
in  the  Northeast  (Lintner  1948, 49; Wright  1893,  15; U.S. Census  Office 
1895a, 75). But these modest investments added up. In 1890  these two interme- 
diaries claimed more than five million depositors and members, and held 60 
percent of the nation’s intermediated mortgage debt. 
With so many members dispersed so widely across space, these intermediar- 
ies could have become large in size and lent broadly  within  and across the 
nation’s urban markets. By doing so they could have become large and highly 
diversified  delegated  monitors,  and  stimulated  the  flow of  mortgage  funds 
among regional markets. But mutuals and building associations chose to lend 
only within their local markets. Both lending structures relied on social, cul- 
tural, and economic relationships in their communities to make and enforce 
loans at lower cost than individual investors, and to establish their credibility 
as delegated monitors.  Outside community boundaries,  however, they were 
neither cost-effective nor credible. 
Mutual savings banks were organized and run by local business leaders and 
entrepreneurs who already had accumulated knowledge about local real estate 
markets and lending conditions. They were less qualified, however, to make 
and enforce loans in more distant markets. Two early antebellum mutuals, for 
example, adopted “investment polic[ies] . . . marked by a considerable degree 
of provincialism. It is almost as if the managers refused to invest in any asset 
that they could not touch” (Davis and Payne 1958, 404). John Lintner (1948, 
406-8)  explained why mutuals continued to behave in the same way during the 
early twentieth century. He found that between 1918 and 1931 Massachusetts’ 
savings banks experienced a 3.8 percent net loss rate on mortgages that were 
made close to the home office (in the same or adjoining cities), while the loss 
rate was 7.1 percent on loans made two or three cities distant, and 10  percent 
on those located four or more cities away from the bank. He concluded that 
“[tlhe results clearly point up the greater hazard of  lending outside the area 
with which the bank is most familiar and within which its lending facilities are 
most adequate” (Lintner 1948, 408). 
Building associations relied on its members to make and enforce mortgages 
cooperatively, and had to restrict their activities to areas that were already well 
known to the membership and easy for them to observe. Members pledged to 
purchase association shares equal in value to the principal of the home mort- 
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ments on these shares were collected at mandatory monthly meetings, and each 
member  eventually  received  his  loan  as  the  share payments  accumulated. 
Members jointly  monitored  the  condition  of  the property  that  secured  the 
others’ loans, and the ability of other members to make share and interest pay- 
ments as promised  (Bodfish  1931; Clark and Chase 1925). Not surprisingly, 
building associations were often small, single-neighborhood organizations. In 
fact, in  1890 more than twenty-three hundred building associations operated 
in just the twenty-eight largest cities in the country. Each averaged only 314 
members. The focus on community lending continued  during the  late nine- 
teenth and early twentieth centuries even after elected officers and committees 
of members assumed the responsibility for the mortgage business of most asso- 
ciations. These individuals were drawn from the general membership and had 
no special knowledge of remote loan markets, much less experience in them 
(Bodfish 193  1). 
Besides the cost advantage, these two mutual organizations also used their 
local character to establish credibility. The general membership of these mu- 
tual organizations  need  not have been  overly concerned  that the trustees  or 
member committees would exploit their informational advantage because none 
of these “insiders” held residual claims on their institutions’ portfolios. The 
greater danger was that trustees or member committees, who served without 
pay,  might  neglect  their  duties  or select  and  enforce mortgages  carelessly. 
These individuals had strong incentives not to shirk their responsibilities, how- 
ever, because to do so risked the loss of their reputations as well as the imposi- 
tion of sanctions within their local community. 
The trustees of mutual savings banks were self-proclaimed philanthropists 
who publicly committed themselves to help the poor by providing a safe outlet 
for the savings of the working class. The goal was to raise the material and 
spiritual welfare of the unfortunate and to relieve the “better-off‘’ citizens from 
having  to care for the destitute  population.  Whatever other motives trustees 
may have had, and there has been controversy on this score, there is little doubt 
that a failure of a savings bank would have resulted in substantial public embar- 
rassment for its organizers (Olmstead 1976, 108-16).  This may explain why 
“[flor the country as a whole, the total losses to depositors over their entire 
131 year history have been less than  114  of  1% of the deposit balances now 
outstanding” (Lintner 1948, 21). It seems unlikely that the trustees would have 
shown such care and diligence if they had been serving members located far 
away from their own communities.  The officers of building associations, on 
the other hand, had incentives to perform their duties faithfully because their 
closest neighbors and friends relied on them to do so. Many associations served 
tightly knit ethnic and religious communities, so an irresponsible member or 
director could expect to suffer social sanctions as well as a loss of face. 
The reader may wony that regulatory restrictions, rather than the cost and 
reputational advantages of localization, imposed a narrow geographic focus on 
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state until the 1950s, but we have already seen that they limited their activities 
to markets that were even more concentrated. The case is even clearer for the 
building associations. Most states did not even begin to regulate these organi- 
zations until the 1890s, but by then the members of some four thousand associ- 
ations had already decided to restrict the lending operations of their coopera- 
tives to their home counties (Rosenthal 1888, 103). Building associations were 
prohibited from lending out of state only after the “national” associations had 
unsuccessfully  attempted to extend this lending structure to the interregional 
market in the 1880s and 1890s (Bodfish 1931, 113). It will be useful to briefly 
examine their story. 
Beginning in the mid- 1880s the “nationals”  began to recruit members and 
make loans across and within broad regional markets (Bodfish 1931, chap. 7). 
These organizations attracted members by emphasizing the benefits that could 
be  derived  by  extending  the  building-association  form  over  a  wider  area: 
greater safety (because the loan portfolio was geographically diverse), higher 
earnings (because the association could penetrate markets with high mortgage 
rates), and lower expenses (because of efficiencies of large scale). The officers 
of the nationals could not cost-effectively  make and enforce mortgages from 
headquarters, of course, and so local loan boards were established to perform 
these functions in markets hundreds of miles away. While these delegated mon- 
itors were knowledgeable  about their home markets  (many were real estate 
agents and developers), they were given no incentives to place the interests of 
an anonymous membership  above their own. The directors of  the  nationals 
should have monitored loan agents of this type with great care. It would have 
been  very costly to do so, however, and the nationals established no formal 
mechanisms to assure the reliability of their local boards. So it was no surprise 
when many mortgages went into default after 1893 and the nationals began to 
acquire substantial amounts of overvalued real estate. The end of the national 
movement is generally dated at 1896, after the failure of the largest national 
association in the country. A wave of closings followed, and only 6 out of 240 
national associations survived the century. 
The local associations believed  that the failure of the  nationals provided 
compelling evidence that long-distance cooperative mortgage lending struc- 
tures were inherently  unreliable. A more disinterested group, the Massachu- 
setts Bank Commissioners, reached the same conclusion: “A co-operative bank 
is in all respects  a local institution. Its members  should be  taken  from the 
immediate vicinity where it is formed, and its loans made upon real estate in 
the same locality” (Eldredge 1893). Thus, a broad range of evidence, opinion, 
and experience all point to the same conclusion: intermediated structures that 
were successful in local mortgage markets could not lend over wider areas both 
credibly and at low cost. 
Before considering the interregional market, it will be useful to provide a 
more precise picture of the significance of local intermediated lending chan- 
nels. Table 7.1 reports the relative importance of these institutions by  region Table 7.1  Structure of Intermediated Mortgage Lending, 1890-93 
Held by Local Lendersb 
Banks (96)  Mortgage Companies 
Held by Interregional Lendersb 
Total 
Debt  Intermediaries  Building  Insurance  Building  Passed-Through‘ 
Mortgage  Held by  Savings  Local  Life  National 
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1  6  61 
_  1  63 







-  3 (2%) 
33  121 (18%) 







-  71  12 





0.2  3 (1%) 
5  194 (3%) 
Sources: Mortgage debt outstanding: U.S. Census Office 1895b. Commercial and savings banks: U.S. Comptroller of Currency 1890. Local and national building associa- 
tions: Wright 1893. Life insurance companies: Pritchett 1977. Mortgage companies: Massachusetts 1890-95; New York 1891-97. 
Notes:  Debt for 1 January 1890, while debt held by  intermediaries for as close to  1 January 1893 as possible. Debt allocated to region of intermediary’s headquarters, 
except for the insurance companies. 
”Regions are New England: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT; Mid-Atlantic: DE, NJ, NY, PA, MD, DC; East North Central: IL, IN, MI, OH, WI;  West North Central: IA, MN, 
NB,  ND, SD, WY, MT  South Atlantic: VA, WV, FL, GA, NC, SC; East South Central: AL, KY, MS, TN, LA; West South Central: MO, AR, KS, TX, CO, NM; Pacific: 
AZ,  ID, NV, UT,  CA, OR, WA. 
bThe percentage shown in the table is the share of “Held by Intermediaries” in each region. 
‘Mortgages held by insurance companies are allocated to the region where they were originated. 
dDebentures issued by mortgage companies backed by mortgage portfolios. 
““Passed-through” mortgages are originated by mortgage companies but held by  individuals. In parentheses is the percentage of the total regional mortgage debt passed 
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and for the nation as a whole. The numbers in the table are rough: mortgage 
debt outstanding was measured by  the Census Office as of  1 January  1890, 
whereas the amounts of debt held by intermediaries were taken from a variety 
of government reports prepared between  1890 and 1893. My aim is to provide 
a sense of relative magnitudes, however, and the estimates are reliable enough 
for this purpose. 
As noted earlier, mutual savings banks and local building associations were 
the most important institutional mortgage lenders in the late nineteenth century 
and  together  held  three-fifths  of  the  nation’s  intermediated  mortgage  debt. 
When deposit  and  stock  savings banks  are included,  the share supplied by 
strictly local lending agencies increases to three-quarters. In addition, we shall 
see later that many insurance companies were also lending close to home at 
this time. So the vast majority of all intermediated mortgage lending was local 
in character right before the turn of the century. 
The rest of the paper focuses on the interregional market.  I  have already 
discussed the national associations which, for all of their notoriety, contributed 
only 3 percent of the intermediated lending flow in I893 and disappeared alto- 
gether by  1900. Life insurance and mortgage companies were the only other 
institutional channels through which interregional mortgage lending took place 
in the early 1890s. 
7.3  Loan Agents as Delegated Monitors 
We have seen that mortgage lending was primarily a local activity before 
1900. An accurate appraisal required a detailed inspection of the property and 
an intimate familiarity with the determinants of  current and future property 
values in that market. Effective monitoring of a defaulter entailed continuous, 
“hands-on” contact and periodic reappraisals of the property as well. The re- 
quirement for local supervision and control became even greater if the lender 
acquired the land through deed or foreclosure. So an investor could lend inter- 
regionally only if she employed a representative located close to the property 
to make and enforce the mortgage contract. These loan agents were used by 
every intermediary or individual investor who participated in the national mort- 
gage market. In this section I show how loan agents established themselves as 
low-cost and credible delegated monitors. 
Because proximity to the borrower was the critical determinant of the cost 
of mortgage making, loan agents normally resided in the county in which they 
conducted business. To be an effective delegated monitor the agent also had to 
be familiar with local real estate conditions. We have seen that national build- 
ing associations appointed real estate brokers and developers to their local loan 
boards. Allan Bogue (1955) has documented a similar pattern for the Daven- 
ports, a New York family that invested heavily in farm mortgages in Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska between 1870 and 1900. The family chose either 
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loan agents in  all  four states. Agents  like  these  could  observe  information 
about individual owners and property values in their local markets at low cost. 
There were individuals willing to serve eastern investors  in most western 
towns, but a reliable loan agent first had to be selected and trained. Mortgage 
lending was a complex undertaking that required a thorough understanding of 
the investor’s particular preferences and methods, and the ability to implement 
these with good judgment. The Davenports sent a son to live in Illinois for 
several years in the 1860s to establish the family’s western mortgage loan busi- 
ness (Bogue 1955,9-11). During this time he learned how to select borrowers, 
set loan terms, and maintain  lending records.  He also developed techniques 
for handling delinquencies, foreclosure proceedings, and land sales. Potential 
agents had  general knowledge  of  these  matters,  but  the Davenports corres- 
ponded extensively with new agents to instruct them about the family’s particu- 
lar procedures and methods. Furthermore, after training an agent, the investor 
still had to evaluate his competence and judgment. The Davenports typically 
made a few loans through a new loan agent and evaluated his performance on 
these before allowing him to make more loans (Bogue 1955,62). Investors as 
large as the Davenports, who made $4 million of loans in thirty years, could 
spread the fixed costs of selecting and training a loan agent over many loans. 
For small investors, however, these costs were prohibitive. 
A  second, and  greater,  difficulty  associated  with  interregional  mortgage 
lending was that the loan agent had to be given incentives to negotiate  and 
enforce loans faithfully. Like any delegated monitor, the loan agent observed 
hidden  information  about  the  borrower  before  and after the  loan had  been 
made. He had both opportunity and incentive, therefore, to increase his own 
well-being at the investor’s expense by making high-risk loans, sharing “hidden 
returns” with the property owner, or supplying too little enforcement effort. In 
addition, the opportunities were greater and incentives stronger because agents 
had collateral interests in their local real estate markets. 
So investors monitored loan agents to assure their performance. The Daven- 
ports, for example, corresponded frequently even with their most experienced 
agents and sent a family member west each year to evaluate their agents’ work 
directly. Supervision of this type protected against gross negligence or fraud, 
but could not assure that the agent was diligent when negotiating or enforcing 
each loan. So a mechanism other than supervision was required to provide loan 
agents with incentives to be credible delegated monitors. 
To explain the mechanism that was used I must be more precise about the 
structure  of  the  contract  between  an  investor  and  a  loan  agent.  The agent 
agreed to search for prospective  borrowers, take their applications, perform 
appraisals, and forward the papers for the investor’s approval. If the investor 
accepted the loan, the agent was compensated with a commission. The com- 
mission was calculated as a percentage of the loan’s principal and was normally 
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mortgage  to the investor and agreed to collect payments and to enforce the 
loan until it was repaid. 
This contract had a peculiar feature. The uninformed investor bore all of the 
monetary risk, while the informed agent received a commission that was fixed 
and independent of the loan’s outcome. We have seen earlier that the mortgage 
loan itself specifies a fixed payment for the uninformed  party  (the investor), 
and made the informed party  (the property  owner) the residual claimant.  It 
appears, therefore, that the contract  between  investor and loan agent placed 
risk  on the  wrong  party  and exacerbated,  rather  than  solved,  the hidden- 
information  and -action problems.  Why would  an agent select a safe mort- 
gage or enforce a loan if he suffered no monetary loss when the borrower de- 
faulted? 
The contract can be rationalized on informational grounds when the agent’s 
payoff  and incentives are clearly understood.  Under  the contract,  the agent 
faced the risk associated with searching for a mortgage loan. He might spend 
considerable time and effort taking applications and making appraisals before 
finding a loan that the investor would approve. If the investor did not approve, 
of course, the agent received no compensation. Had agents been compensated 
with a salary, on the other hand, they could have expended no effort, reported 
that no qualified borrowers  were available,  and still received compensation. 
The commission system placed the costs and risks of search on the agent so he 
had  an  incentive  to  discontinue  negotiations  with  unqualified  borrowers 
quickly  and  to pursue only  high-quality  applications  that  the investor  was 
likely to approve. 
The agent’s incentives to enforce an outstanding mortgage under this con- 
tract are less obvious. Recall that intensive monitoring was required when the 
borrower defaulted or foreclosure became imminent. Under the contract, how- 
ever, the agent received a commission when the loan was closed and no addi- 
tional compensation if he had to enforce the loan later.8 For this reason the 
agent’s commission had to include a premium to compensate him for the effort 
he expected to apply if the loan went bad. Once the loan had been made, how- 
ever, the agent assumed the enforcement risk of the loan while the investor 
remained exposed to monetary losses. 
Note that this feature of the commission contract strengthened the agent’s 
incentive to search for high-quality loans. If the investor had agreed instead to 
compensate enforcement effort  only  when  a  default actually  occurred,  the 
8.  One could argue that the enforcement problem would have disappeared if the commission 
was paid during the loan period, or after the debt had been extinguished. Commissions were some- 
times taken as second mortgages. The costs to the agent of enforcing a defaulted loan were much 
greater than the commission, whenever it was paid. Recall that the commission compensated the 
agent for expected enforcement costs and that foreclosure was a low-probability event most of the 
time. Even if the entire commission was paid after the loan was repaid, the agent would still need 
some other inducement to not walk away. The commission was most frequently paid lump-sum 
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agent could have created a demand for these services by making risky loans 
look safe. Under the commission  system, however, the agent imposed costs 
and risk on himself by recommending a low-quality loan to the investor  so 
long as he intended to enforce the mortgage if it went bad. The great danger 
with the commission system, in fact, was that the agent might simply walk 
away from a defaulted loan rather than apply the effort required to enforce it. 
Even worse, if the agent were not committed to enforcing a bad loan, he would 
have been far less concerned about its quality during negotiation. 
The contract, therefore, had to provide the agent with incentives to enforce 
a delinquent  mortgage even though he received no explicit payment for the 
substantial amounts of time and effort that were involved. To provide these 
incentives the agent had to expect to lose something of value if he walked away 
from a bad loan. Investors in the interregional mortgage market entered into 
long-term relationships with their agents and threatened to discontinue lending 
through  them  if  they  failed  to enforce  a loan. It was the promise  of  future 
commissions, therefore, that provided the loan agent with the incentive to en- 
force outstanding loans. 
The effectiveness of this mechanism depended on several factors: the agent’s 
prospects for employment with other investors, the credibility of the investor’s 
threat to terminate the relationship, and the willingness of the investor to con- 
tinue lending within the agent’s market. For example, if the agent’s reputation 
mattered-so  that no other investor would hire him if he shirked on enforce- 
ment-then  the mechanism worked welL9 Later in the paper, however, I will 
emphasize situations when it did not. In particular, the mechanism broke down 
if there was an increase in the demand for the agent’s services outside the rela- 
tionship, or if the investor refused to approve applications for new loans while 
other mortgages remained outstanding. Moreover, the mechanism was weak- 
ened if the investor was reluctant or unable to bear the costs of selecting and 
training a new agent. We shall see that a combination  of these factors arose 
periodically in the historical mortgage market and played an important role in 
the collapse of interregional lending structures. 
For the enforcement mechanism to work at all, of course, the investor had 
to be large enough so that she could credibly promise a steady flow of future 
commissions. I emphasized earlier that large investors also enjoyed scale econ- 
omies when they selected and trained new agents. For both reasons the small 
investor faced formidable obstacles if she attempted  to hire a loan agent di- 
rectly. During the late nineteenth century, however, mortgage rates in the West 
were high enough to attract many eastern investors who were not as wealthy 
as the Davenports. To mobilize this potential flow of mortgage credit, a new 
9. Reputation effects in the investor-loan  agent relationship were likely to have been weak in 
areas of recent settlement, which was the area where loan agents were used most frequently. A 
distant investor would find it difficult to observe the complete history of a prospective loan agent’s 
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mechanism had to arise-one  that could cost-effectively mediate the relation- 
ship between investors and loan agents. 
7.4  Western Mortgage Companies as Monitors of Loan Agents 
Farm mortgage companies first began to monitor loan agents for eastern 
investors during the  185Os.’O Most were organized by successful loan agents 
who sought to expand the volume and geographic  scope of  their mortgage 
brokerage businesses. The industry grew rapidly during the 1870s and 1880s 
as the pace of  settlement accelerated in the plains states, and by  1890 more 
than two hundred of these agencies were selling western farm loans in eastern 
and European markets (Herrick and Ingalls 1915,8-16; Frederiksen 1894; see 
table 7.1). In this section I show how mortgage companies established their 
credibility as monitors of loan agents and explain why that mechanism broke 
down when the supply of interregional mortgage credit expanded rapidly dur- 
ing the 1880s. I argue that nearly all mortgage companies collapsed during the 
1890s because they had “overlent” in response to competitive market pressures 
several years earlier. 
The western mortgage companies used sophisticated methods to negotiate 
and broker loans. A network of field agents located borrowers, filled out stan- 
dardized applications, appraised property, and passed the information along to 
the home office. The company reviewed these materials, along with the agent’s 
confidential  assessment of the quality of each loan, and determined whether 
the borrower was creditworthy. If so, the loan then had to be matched with an 
investor located thousands of miles away. Investors were solicited by advertise- 
ments in the eastern and European press, by sales trips of company representa- 
tives, and through offices set up in New York and other major financial centers 
(Bogue 1955).  After receiving funds from the investor, the company forwarded 
a loan application to her for approval. If the investor approved, the company 
closed the loan and formally assigned it to the investor. At this point, the agent 
(and frequently the company) received  a commission paid by  the borrower. 
The company then collected interest payments and sent them to the investor 
minus a one-half to one percentage point servicing fee. 
This system of negotiating and servicing loans offered several advantages 
over the methods used by investors who dealt directly with loan agents. Most 
important, the mortgage companies provided  “hands on” monitoring of  loan 
agents by full-time traveling supervisors who also evaluated lending conditions 
in established and potential loan markets. In this way the mortgage company 
provided much closer supervision of loan agents than individual investors even 
as large as the Davenports could undertake. The companies also reduced the 
10. Mortgage companies went by  a variety of  names in the historical mortgage market-loan 
and trust, loan and debenture, and investment companies among them. I refer to all of these organi- 
zations as mortgage companies. 226  Kenneth A. Snowden 
need to monitor the loan agent by centralizing many administrative functions, 
such as title search and interest collection, in the home office. Finally, the mort- 
gage company solved one of the vexing problems faced by eastern investors in 
the West-large  balances of  idle funds. The Davenports constantly  prodded 
their agents to locate good borrowers and “get our money working” as repay- 
ments on existing loans were received  or after funds had been sent West to 
make new loans. Mortgage companies, on the other hand, generated continu- 
ous flows of loan applications and reduced  balances awaiting investment by 
quickly  matching  investors  and borrowers. The J. B. Watkins Company, for 
example, began  to pay  interest  to investors two weeks  after receiving  their 
funds even if there were no loans immediately available for assignment. 
Because of its cost advantages in making and administering loans, the west- 
em mortgage company attracted the funds of investors of modest means for 
whom the costs of directly selecting, training, and monitoring agents would 
have been prohibitive. The company also had to establish its credibility as a 
monitor of loan agents, however, because an information asymmetry arose be- 
tween it and the investors. The return on each mortgage brokered by the com- 
panies was determined by three factors: the exogenous risk of the project being 
financed, the quality and intensity of the services provided by the loan agent, 
and  the companies’  own  diligence  in  supervising  the  agent. The mortgage 
company observed information about all three influences, but the uninformed 
investor could not distinguish which factor had been responsible if a borrower 
defaulted. The mortgage company had both incentive and opportunity, there- 
fore, to raise its own payoff by monitoring loan agents carelessly or by under- 
reporting the loan payments made by borrowers. 
Mortgage companies assured investors that they would not exploit their in- 
formational advantage by guaranteeing the loans they sold. One practitioner, 
Kingman Robins, showed a clear understanding  that the guarantee served to 
establish credibility when he noted that a mortgage company  “cannot allow 
[its] client to suffer the loss of a single dollar, for [slhe would make no allow- 
ances  in  case  of  loss-[slhe  would  lose confidence  in  [the company] and 
would wholly  discontinue buying from [it]” (Robins  1916, 84). The mecha- 
nism worked informally in the 1870s. Investors were instructed to return delin- 
quent mortgages to the company and were either repaid or given a replacement 
loan in return. Custom eventually became formalized in the 1880s when mort- 
gage companies started to guarantee the principal  and interest on the mort- 
gages they brokered-the  first use of mortgage loan insurance. 
By guaranteeing its loans the mortgage company pledged to absorb all of 
the enforcement risk that investors faced in the interregional market. It could 
do so at low cost because of its scale and location. After a default, the loan 
agent monitored the borrower and rescheduled the loan if possible. If not, the 
loan was turned over to the legal department of the company, which conducted 
foreclosure actions from the home office. The farm then became the responsi- 
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tised and sold. Establishing an  in-house enforcement operation  as sophisti- 
cated as this involved substantial fixed costs, but the mortgage company could 
spread these costs over many loans. The company also diversified away most 
enforcement risk by making loans over a relatively wide geographic area, and 
so  could  offer  the  guarantee  to  investors  without  demanding  large  risk 
premia.” 
In the 1880s some mortgage companies adopted a second method of guaran- 
teeing the investor’s return. They incorporated, held individual mortgages in 
eastern trust accounts, and issued mortgage bonds backed by the loans.’2  Each 
bond series was secured by a different pool of mortgages, but all of the series 
were effectively secured by the company’s total assets and so were referred to 
as debentures. The American mortgage bond market of the 1880s and 1890s 
never approached the size or depth of its European counterparts, but the vol- 
ume  of  debentures  expanded  rapidly  enough  to  alarm  eastern  regulators 
(Frederiksen 1894). By 1891 New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and sev- 
eral other northeastern states required annual financial reports from those “for- 
eign” mortgage companies that sold loans within their borders. These reports 
were then published for the benefit of the public, but always with the warning 
that the regulators could not verify the quality of the loans that stood behind 
debentures because it was too costly for an outsider to inspect the properties 
that secured individual mortgages (New York 189  1  ;  Massachusetts 1890). De- 
spite the warnings, eastern investors had purchased  $93 million of  mortgage 
debentures by  1893.’? 
Questions were being raised at the same time about the quality of the indi- 
vidual mortgages brokered by the newer and more aggressive companies. Ed- 
ward Darrow (1892), the owner of a Minnesota mortgage company, wrote a 
guide to the western mortgage market in which he cautioned investors not to 
accept western loans too easily. He advised investors to demand that a photo- 
graph of the property he sent along with the loan application and appraisal, 
and then to examine these materials with their own lawyer and architect. Dar- 
row  also cautioned  about  difficulties that  often  arose when  an investor  at- 
tempted  to exercise  a  loan  guarantee-especially  since some  disreputable 
companies had no intention of honoring it. 
Darrow was apprehensive that the rapid expansion of the western mortgage 
11. The J. B. Watkins Company, for example, was one of the first companies to be established 
in Kansas and eventually extended its operations over five states and sold $20 million of mortgages 
between 1872 and 1893. See Bogue 1955 for an extensive discussion of its operations. 
12. Mortgage bonds had first been introduced to the United States during the antebellum period 
(Sparks 1932). Brewer 1976 provides an excellent discussion of mortgage companies in the North- 
east that issued mortgage-backed bonds in the early 1870s. Several of these companies were op- 
erating in the West at the same time as the western companies I discuss here. For a discussion of 
how the mortgage bond was imported from Europe to the United States during the nineteenth 
century, see Snowden 1993. 
13. Table 7.1 reports the regional distribution of  both passed-through mortgages and debentures 
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business in the 1880s had created an intense competition  for borrowers that 
threatened the reputation and credibility of all mortgage companies. In particu- 
lar, Darrow believed that some of the newer companies were sending poorly 
secured loans to the East and were at risk of failure if the land boom abated. 
That process began  in the late  1880s as droughts appeared in several areas. 
Most mortgage companies were able to survive these early pressures, but by 
the  early 1890s the collapse had begun. Eastern  regulators  supervised  167 
companies in  1893 but discontinued  their published  reports only four years 
later because so few companies remained  in operation. In fact, only  14 sur- 
vived  to join  the  Farm  Mortgage  Banking Association  twenty  years  later 
(Frederiksen 1894; Robins 1916). 
To explain why western  farm mortgage  companies collapsed, I must de- 
scribe an additional feature of the historical mortgage market. Borrowers in 
recently  settled areas usually applied for their first mortgage  after they had 
already acquired and partially improved their property. These loans were writ- 
ten for only three or five years and were normally renewed two or three times 
before the debt was extinguished. The appraisal was a particularly important 
negotiating point when dealing with borrowers who already owned their land, 
because their equity in the property represented their down payment. Mortgage 
companies did not make loans that exceeded one-half, or sometimes one-third, 
of  the property’s  appraised  value.  Therefore, borrowers  who already owned 
their land pressed for high valuations so they could qualify for larger loans or 
lower rates. 
A reliable loan agent resisted pressures to inflate appraisals, but Darrow’s 
observation suggests that the newer, aggressive companies used this practice 
to compete for borrowers. Other observers confirmed his fears. W. F.  Mappin 
(1889, 440) argued that the increase in the supply of eastern credit during the 
1880s created intense competition among mortgage companies, and that many 
were accepting loans that would have been rejected as poorly secured in nor- 
mal times. Recalling this period, the secretary of  one western mortgage com- 
pany  remarked,  “I found drafts, money orders, and currency heaped on my 
desk every morning and could not loan the money as fast as it came in.” This 
same company finally resorted to hiring inexperienced loan agents who made 
mortgages based on “absurd” appraisals (Harger 1906,572). 
The older, established companies should have maintained loan quality in the 
face of these pressures because they had been building reputations for safety 
and conservatism for more than a decade. But their agents in the field found 
that they could not compete for borrowers if they based loan terms on accurate 
appraisals. So even experienced and reliable loan agents began to recommend 
marginal applications for approval. In order to retain their agents the mortgage 
companies felt pressured to approve loans that they knew were poorly secured. 
Allan Bogue’s incisive account of the Watkins Company’s experience makes 
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During 1886 and 1887 the flow of eastern and foreign capital into the west- 
ern mortgage business was at its flood. Companies competed  strenuously 
for agents. Greater powers of discretion were placed in the hands of  these 
men than ever before. Greater opportunities for lending unhealthily large 
sums of  money  on  inadequate  security were  also present.  Although  the 
mortgage companies had inspectors who checked the work of these local 
agents, it was impossible for them to examine the  security  behind  every 
loan. . . . If  the traveling inspectors were too strict, the local representative 
could easily find other companies with funds to loan, and the original spon- 
sor would see its flow of  applications diminish. That Stanton and Sprankle 
[agent  supervisors  for the  Watkins  Company]  endeavored  to  keep  their 
agents in line is undoubted; that they unconsciously were stampeded into 
some of  the excesses of their competitors is probable. Sprankle argued in 
February 1888, “One year ago sub-agents and borrowers run [sic]  the loan- 
ing business in this state to suit themselves.” (1955, 144) 
The mortgage companies, like individual investors, established long-term 
relationships with their loan agents so that the threat of termination represented 
an effective incentive device. But the mechanism turned out to be a two-edged 
sword when the supply of mortgage funds and the demand for agents’ services 
increased  dramatically in the  1880s. By then the established companies had 
invested heavily in selecting and training their agents and relied on them to 
help enforce mortgages that were already outstanding. Had the companies re- 
fused to approve the marginal loans that their agents were sending forward, 
they would have had to discontinue lending operations and gone out of busi- 
ness. In order to retain their agents, therefore, even the largest and oldest com- 
panies began to pass through mortgages that they knew were of poor quality. 
I refer to this behavior as overlending. Darrow, Watkins, and other insiders 
understood the implications of making loans on the basis of inflated appraisals, 
because the practice increased the average probability of foreclosure and intro- 
duced systematic  enforcement risk to the western  mortgage market. In this 
environment any reversal of land prices was certain to lead many borrowers to 
default at once, and to drive enforcement costs far above expected levels. 
Thus, the collapse of the  western  mortgage companies  in the  1890s was 
directly attributable to high rates of default and foreclosure on mortgages they 
had made in the late 188Os.I4 The newer companies failed first, either because 
they had made the poorest quality loans or because they did not have the re- 
sources to both honor their guarantee to investors and enforce the loans that 
had gone bad.  As late as  1892 New  York  authorities continued to maintain 
that the crisis would affect only the most recently established firms. But older 
companies survived longer only by continuing to market low-quality  loans, 
often on the same land they had acquired through foreclosure. By 1895 nearly 
14. For an  empirical examination of the failure of the Watkins Company, see Snowden and Abu 
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all of the mortgage companies were in receivership and had left their investors 
with large amounts of unsalable land. 
The transfer of  land from mortgage company to investor created a powerful 
feedback effect that deepened and prolonged the mortgage crisis of the 1890s. 
Investors had neither the expertise nor the ability to manage, maintain, and sell 
foreclosed land, and had entrusted their funds to the mortgage company so that 
they would never have to perform  these functions.  So the land boom of the 
1880s quickly turned to a land glut as eastern investors and the receivers of 
failed mortgage companies tried to liquidate their landholdings as quickly as 
possible.  The  sell-off  reinforced  the  downward  spiral  in  property  values, 
caused more borrowers to default, and additional mortgage companies to fail. 
The lesson  would not soon be forgotten,  as individual investors never again 
entered the interregional mortgage market in the numbers or with the enthusi- 
asm of the 1880s. 
By 1900 the interregional mortgage market lay in institutional disarray. The 
most important institutional lenders, savings banks and building associations, 
were firmly committed to lending only within their local area. Meanwhile the 
two  innovations  designed  specifically  to facilitate  an  interregional  flow of 
funds, national building associations and western mortgage companies, were 
both in  ruins. Their failures had revealed  the difficulties of establishing  and 
maintaining  incentive  structures  for distant  loan  agents. They  also demon- 
strated that any investor who entered the interregional mortgage market faced 
the real possibility of one day having to enforce mortgages herself. By  1900 
one type of investor had gained experience both in negotiating and enforcing 
mortgage loans interregionally: the life insurance company. 
7.5  Interregional Lending by Life Insurance Companies before 1900: 
The Development of Links with Mortgage Companies 
Before 1900 life insurance companies were the third-largest source of inter- 
mediated mortgage credit in the United States (see table 7.1). The majority of 
the industry’s lending operations were local in character because most compa- 
nies were permitted by law to lend only within the state where they were head- 
q~artered.’~  The notable exceptions were a few firms located in Connecticut 
and Wisconsin that had been granted broad lending powers right after the Civil 
War. For the next thirty years five of these companies-Aetna,  Connecticut 
Mutual, Phoenix, Travelers’, and Northwestern Mutual-dominated  the inter- 
regional mortgage business of the life insurance industry. They made loans on 
commercial property  and farms from Indiana  to the western plains, and by 
1890 together held 30 percent of the industry’s mortgage portfolio. During the 
period this handful of companies settled upon three organizational principles 
15. By  1870 New Jersey, Ohio, California, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, and, most notably, New 
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that would shape the industry’s lending structures well into the twentieth cen- 
tury: (1) the separation of mortgage lending operations from insurance policy 
sales; (2) a reliance on independent mortgage companies to negotiate and ser- 
vice loans; and (3) the internalization of the property management component 
of  mortgage enforcement. The activities of these five innovative firms repre- 
sented the first phase in the development of “the life insurance-mortgage  com- 
pany connection.”  In this  section I examine how  and why these organizing 
principles were adopted. 
It might  interest  the  reader to learn  that the first organizational principle 
enumerated above was in direct contrast to my expectations at the outset of 
this project. My original conjecture was that life insurance companies domi- 
nated the interregional  mortgage market because of  a technological comple- 
mentarity between mortgage lending and insurance sales. Life insurance poli- 
cies are subject to the same types of hidden-action and -information problems 
as mortgage contracts, and during the late nineteenth century most large com- 
panies began to market their insurance product throughout the nation. In doing 
so the companies had to manage geographically dispersed networks of policy 
sales agents and so faced an information problem similar to that of mortgage 
lenders who had  to control distant loan agents.  In particular,  the  insurance 
companies had to discourage their sales representatives from misrepresenting 
the quality of  applicants  simply to earn commissions,  and to prevent these 
agents from shirking their responsibility to carefully investigate policy claims. 
To  do so insurance companies  appointed  general agents  to  supervise  sales 
agents in each regional market and also set up elaborate monitoring divisions 
at the home office to evaluate applications and claims sent in from the field. 
These mechanisms were strikingly similar to those implemented by the west- 
ern mortgage companies. I thought it likely, therefore, that the insurance com- 
panies came to dominate the interregional mortgage market because they could 
both make loans and sell policies through a single agency network. 
In fact, insurance companies separated mortgage lending activities from pol- 
icy sales soon after the Civil War.  Northwestern Mutual of Wisconsin  con- 
fronted the issue in the early 1870s when the company’s policy sales force was 
still permitted to solicit mortgage loan applications and send them to the home 
office for approval by  the Investment  Committee  (Williamson  and  Smalley 
1957, 63-67,  77-81).  The investment group maintained an explicit policy of 
evaluating each loan application only on its merit, however, and did not con- 
sider whether it had been submitted by a policyholder. The sales agents pressed 
the company to adopt a new policy at this time so that the volume of mortgage 
lending in each state would be tied to the value of policies sold there and pref- 
erence would be given to the loan applications of policyholders. The Executive 
Committee rejected this attempt to strengthen the connection between policy 
sales and mortgage lending. Its members noted that sales agents lacked the 
specialized knowledge of real estate markets that was required to accurately 
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that some sales agents would  be  induced to approve poor-quality mortgage 
loans simply to sell more policies and increase their commission income. A 
few insurance companies actually combined mortgage lending and policy sales 
during the 1870s, but these structures were quickly abandoned for the reasons 
cited  by  Northwestern’s  officials.I6 So  policy  sales  and  mortgage  lending 
agency networks became  completely  separated within  insurance companies 
even though they controlled similar informational asymmetries for the same in- 
termediary. 
After rejecting the sales agents’ proposal, Northwestern established a more 
formal method of negotiating and enforcing its interregional mortgage port- 
folio. In 1877 the company hired several salaried “loan agents” and assigned 
each one to set up an office of  the mortgage lending division in a different 
regional market. These branch offices operated as internal mortgage compa- 
nies.  They established  contacts  with  independent  loan agents  and  brokers, 
evaluated the loan applications submitted by these individuals, and then  ap- 
praised  the  property  that  secured the  loans.  The application  was  then  for- 
warded to the home office for final review. If approved there, the branch office 
closed and serviced the loan. The independent agent or broker was paid a com- 
mission  by the borrower and normally helped the branch office enforce the 
loan without  compensation  in order to maintain a good reputation  with the 
company. 
Northwestern was a pioneer in the interregional mortgage business, but its 
reliance on a branch-office  system turned out to be unusual.  It was the Con- 
necticut companies that developed the second general feature of the insurance 
industry’s  interregional  mortgage  lending  system-the  use  of  independent 
mortgage companies located in the West, Midwest, and South to negotiate and 
enforce loans for them. These mortgage companies were identical in structure 
and function, in some cases even in identity, to those that served individual 
eastern investors. Different Connecticut companies established different types 
of relationships with their mortgage company correspondents, however. Aetna 
chose to lend through only one mortgage company in each market and relied 
on the exclusivity of the relationship to strengthen that agency’s incentive to 
perform  faithfully.  The company  specialized  in  farm  mortgages  and  made 
more than fifty thousand loans between 1870 and  1900 through a very small 
number of companies located in Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota. Travel- 
ers’, on the other hand, used several companies in each state and made both 
urban and farm mortgages through them.” 
16. Brewer (1976) discusses Equitable’s unsuccessful attempt to establish its own independent 
mortgage company during the  1870s. and to use its policy sales force to make loans through it. 
Zartman (1906, 137) argues that the Life Association of St. Louis failed during the 1870s because 
it implemented a plan very similar to the one proposed by Northwestern’s sales agents. 
17. These generalizations about the number of mortgages made by the Aetna and Travelers’ are 
drawn from an inspection of the companies’ mortgage records, which are held at the American 
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Aetna’s system worked well. The company suffered modest losses during 
the late 1870s when real estate holdings reached 5 percent of total mortgage 
investment, but it acquired very little additional property during the turbulent 
1890s (Aetna 1947).  In contrast, Travelers’ had to foreclose on 650 of the 2,100 
loans that it had made through just two companies during the 1890s and ac- 
quired $0.6 million in western farm property as a result. The company also 
saw nearly all of its western correspondents fail during the decade and so had 
to manage the liquidation of  this property on its own (Travelers’  1890-95). 
Travelers’ was much better equipped to assume the enforcement obligations of 
its western mortgage company correspondents, however, than the individual 
investors who had lent through the same firms. In  fact, the life insurance- 
mortgage company connection became the dominant interregional mortgage 
lending structure precisely because of this third characteristic of  their organi- 
zational structure-the  insurance companies could conduct their own property 
management operations if became necessary for them to do so. 
Insurance companies learned of the risks and costs associated with mortgage 
loan enforcement during the Depression of  1873, when eastern urban land val- 
ues collapsed and seventy-one companies failed from mortgage-related prob- 
lems (Zartman 1906, 133). When the collapse in real estate values spread to 
western markets in the mid-l870s,  therefore, attention naturally shifted to the 
few eastern companies that had recently entered the interregional mortgage 
market.  In  1876 the Connecticut legislature commissioned an independent 
audit of that state’s companies, which found that Aetna, Connecticut Mutual, 
Phoenix, and Travelers’ together held $46 million in mortgages on western 
properties and had  acquired $8.1 million of  real estate through foreclosure 
(Connecticut 1878). At the time of the audit most of the property was held by 
Connecticut Mutual, and by  1880 this one company had acquired $5 million 
of  real estate in Chicago, $3 million in St. Louis, and $2 million in Detroit 
(Zartman 1906, 30). Despite these apparent difficulties the auditors declared 
all of the Connecticut companies sound because each of them, including the 
Connecticut Mutual, had disposed of foreclosed real estate without absorbing 
substantial losses. This was a remarkable accomplishment, given that the com- 
panies had to manage and sell substantial amounts of  property so far away 
from headquarters. 
During the 1880s and 1890s Northwestern also demonstrated that it could 
effectively manage foreclosed real estate across regional boundaries (William- 
son and Smalley 1957, 77-78,  122-23). In  the 1870s the company acquired 
$1.5 million of  farm property through foreclosure, or  some  15 percent of 
the value of  its mortgage portfolio. Northwestern then came under consider- 
able pressure to dispose of these farms quickly, even though the strategy would 
have generated substantial losses. State regulators threatened to intervene be- 
cause the company’s charter permitted it to own real estate only in an emer- 
gency. In addition, some company officials argued that the recent wave of fore- 
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insiders argued that the company would earn a high return on its farmland by 
postponing liquidation until property values recovered. A compromise position 
prevailed.  To  keep real  estate  holdings  at  acceptable  levels,  the  company 
quickly sold off those properties that were unlikely to appreciate in value. At 
the same time it established a separate real estate division to manage the better- 
quality farms until they could be sold at a profit. During the 1880s Northwest- 
em gradually sold off farms under this program, but it acquired even more land 
in the early  1890s before liquidation of the property  that had been acquired 
earlier had been completed. The company finally disposed of all of its farm 
real estate between  1895 and  1904, and its property  management  operation 
earned between 8.4 and 11.6 percent in each of  these years. 
The property management operations of Northwestern and the Connecticut 
companies proved to be profitable, but the reader should recall that these activi- 
ties involved the most costly and effort-intensive contingencies associated with 
mortgage enforcement. This was especially true when property has to be man- 
aged across regional  boundaries.  Lester Zartman  (1906, 119) calculated  the 
ratio of management  expenses to property  value for the twenty-nine  largest 
life insurance companies between  1896 and 1904 and found that it was highest 
for the  three interregional  lenders  discussed  here:  Travelers’  (17  percent), 
Aetna (9 percent), and Northwestern (7 percent). No other company had a ratio 
greater than 5.2 percent, and the New York companies, which were still lend- 
ing almost exclusively within local markets, all had ratios under 3 percent. Life 
insurance companies were uniquely suited to bear the costs of these operations 
because of the economies of scale that were related to their primary business- 
selling life insurance policies. Efficiency required them to write a large number 
of insurance policies in order to reduce the variability of claim payments and, 
thus, the share of assets they were required to hold in low-earning reserves. To 
accomplish this end, insurance companies had to grow very large in size and 
sell policies broadly across space. As a result, they were free to invest in very 
long term assets, such as property  acquired through foreclosure, and had al- 
ready made some of the fixed investments that were necessary for operating 
interregional property management divisions. 
The unique combination of large size, a national market, and the long-term 
nature of their liabilities provided insurance companies with the resources and 
organizational  flexibility  to assume substantial  investments in  interregional 
property without jeopardizing their solvency. This was in marked contrast to 
national building associations and independent mortgage companies that were 
inadequately capitalized, given the short-term nature of their liabilities, to ab- 
sorb the very high levels of enforcement costs that were generated during mort- 
gage crises. Insurance companies came to dominate the interregional mortgage 
market because of their intrinsic ability to cope with contingent enforcement 
costs,  therefore,  and not  because  they had  an  advantage in negotiating  and 
enforcing interregional mortgage loans under ‘‘normal” circumstances. In fact, 
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external mortgage companies and to assume enforcement activities only when 
these correspondents failed. So the dominance of the life insurance-mortgage 
company connection was intimately associated with the instability of the na- 
tional mortgage market. 
Northwestern  and  the  Connecticut  companies  demonstrated  that  inter- 
regional mortgage lending was both feasible and profitable for insurance com- 
panies, but the great bulk of the industry’s mortgage lending was still local in 
character by  the end of  the nineteenth century. This pattern  was largely  the 
result  of  New  York’s  restriction  on out-of-state lending because  companies 
headquartered there held such a large share of  the industry’s assets. Had the 
New York companies allocated their investments in the same manner as Con- 
necticut firms, they would have held an $82 million portfolio of interregional 
loans in  1890-an  amount equivalent to the total farm mortgage debt in Ne- 
braska or twice the actual volume of interregional lending by the life insurance 
industry.I8 In fact, the New York regulation probably had a larger impact on 
the spatial allocation of nineteenth-century mortgage funds than the more no- 
torious prohibition on mortgage lending by National Banks. 
The New York companies lobbied for a relaxation of  out-of-state lending 
restrictions throughout the  1870s and  188Os, and had good reasons to do so. 
The companies were aggressively expanding national policy sales networks at 
the  time, and were concerned  that  some western  and  southern states  might 
restrict their sales operations if  they appeared to be “draining” savings from 
the rest of  the country to finance mortgage investment back east. More im- 
portantly, they  were aware that western  and southern mortgages rates were 
much higher than those in eastern metropolitan areas, and that interregional 
mortgage loans were an attractive investment outlet. But the New York compa- 
nies did not immediately enter the interregional mortgage business when they 
were finally granted broad lending powers in 1886. An executive of the Metro- 
politan  explained that his company continued  to lend close to home  in the 
1890s because the higher rates of return available in the West were more than 
offset by the extra costs and risks associated with interregional lending during 
these crisis years (Keller 1963, 135). But by then the stage was set for Metro- 
politan, and most  of  the  large northeastern  insurance companies,  to follow 
Northwestern  and  the  Connecticut  companies  into  the  national  mortgage 
market. 
7.6  The Expansion and Collapse of the Life 
Insurance-Mortgage  Connection 
Northwestern  and  the  Connecticut  companies  had  worked  out  the  basic 
structure and methods of interregional mortgage lending by 1890. But by then 
18. The Connecticut companies allocated 52 percent of all assets to mortgage lending in 1889, 
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it was still unclear whether the life insurance-mortgage  company connection 
would become widely used within the industry or just how important insurance 
companies would become to the interregional flow of mortgage credit. Events 
over the next decade did little to clarify the prospects. Northwestern and the 
Connecticut life insurance companies survived the western land crisis of the 
1890s, but the disruption had a chilling effect on their mortgage lending opera- 
tions. Between 1892 and 1902 mortgage loans decreased from 80 to 46 percent 
of total assets at Northwestern, from 60 to 37 percent at Travelers’, and from 
46 to 41 percent at Aetna (Williamson and Smalley 1957, 126). From this point 
life insurance companies increased mortgage lending activities through their 
mortgage company correspondents so rapidly that by the early 1920s the indus- 
try had become the most important source of farm mortgage credit in the coun- 
try, and had begun to play a substantial role in the nation’s residential mortgage 
market as well. During the expansion, however, this lending mechanism suc- 
cumbed to pressures to overlend, and ultimately collapsed in the 1930s. 
The second period of development of the life insurance-mortgage  company 
connection was driven by an unprecedented expansion of farm mortgage debt 
between  1910 and 1920. During the decade farmers borrowed heavily to ex- 
pand and improve their operations as farm prices and incomes trended upward 
before and during World War I. By 1920 outstanding farm mortgage debt in 
the United  States exceeded $8 billion,  and the most important institutional 
sources of mortgage credit were local commercial banks ($1.5 billion) and life 
insurance companies ($1 billion) (Wickens 1932). 
Total farm mortgage  debt grew at a much  more modest pace during the 
1920s, but the institutional structure of the market changed dramatically during 
the decade. Banks began to experience problems with their mortgage loans 
when farm prices and incomes fell violently during the recession of 192  1, and 
by  1929 more than five thousand of them had been forced to close because of 
these difficulties (Johnson  1973). As bank holdings of  farm mortgages de- 
creased, insurance companies actually  expanded their farm mortgage  port- 
folios-by  $0.5 billion in 1921 alone and by  an additional $0.7 billion over 
the next five years (Mormon 1924,42-47).  As a result of these portfolio adjust- 
ments commercial banks held only 12 percent of the nation’s farm mortgage 
debt in 1930, while the life insurance industry held 23 percent of the total. The 
recently created federal land banks and federally chartered mortgage banks 
also  expanded  their  mortgage  lending  operations  dramatically  during  the 
1920s and held another 19 percent of the nation’s farm mortgage debt by the 
end of that decade.19 By the early 1920s, therefore, life insurance companies 
19. The federal agencies concentrated on different areas of the country than the insurance com- 
panies did. Seventeen percent of the loan portfolios of both groups were made on land in the east 
North Central region. But the insurance companies had made only 22 percent of their loans in the 
Northeast, South Atlantic, South Central, Mountain, and Pacific regions, while the land and joint- 
stock banks had made 55 percent of their mortgages there. The big difference, therefore, was in 
the west North Central region. The federally sponsored banks held $500 million in mortgages in 
this area by 1929, while the insurance companies held $1.3 billion-60  percent of all loans made 
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had become the most important source of interregional farm mortgage credit, 
and the most important farm mortgage lender of any kind. 
The life insurance industry began to dominate the farm mortgage market 
because several large northeastern companies finally began to lend interregion- 
ally. Prudential of New Jersey established its farm mortgage lending operation 
in 1898, and the Equitable of New York followed in 1912 (May and Oursler 
1950, 213; Skogvold  1956, 114). But Metropolitan  of  New  York made the 
most dramatic entry into the interregional lending field (James 1947,232-45). 
Before establishing its farm mortgage division in 1916, Metropolitan lent al- 
most exclusively on commercial property in New York City. By 1918, however, 
its farm mortgage portfolio had swelled to $10 million and was spread over 
five states in the Midwest and the plains, and six states in the South. The expan- 
sion of the company’s new line of business continued at this rapid pace for 
more than a decade, and by  1929 Metropolitan had become the second-largest 
farm mortgage lender in the country, with a portfolio of $196 million of farm 
loans spread over twenty-five different states (Woodruff 1937, 49). 
Metropolitan’s rise to prominence in the interregional farm mortgage busi- 
ness reflected a general trend within the insurance industry. Seven life insur- 
ance companies held more than $100 million of farm mortgages in  1929, and 
six of them were relative newcomers to the interregional market-Metropoli- 
tan, Equitable,  and Mutual of New York; Prudential  and Mutual  Benefit of 
New Jersey; and John Hancock of  Massachusetts (Temporary National Eco- 
nomic Committee 1940a, 161). Together these companies held $921 million 
of farm mortgage loans by the end of the 1920s, or 44 percent of the entire 
insurance industry’s agricultural portfolio. On the other hand, the four Con- 
necticut companies that had played such a prominent role in the western farm 
mortgage market before  1900 held a combined farm loan portfolio of  only 
$165 million. 
Of the firms that had pioneered the interregional business in the nineteenth 
century, only Northwestern maintained a leading position after 1900. In fact, 
its farm mortgage portfolio of $216 million was the largest in the industry in 
1929. Northwestern  was  also unique  because it continued to make interre- 
gional loans through a system of twenty-five branch offices that were staffed 
by  company employees. In contrast, all of the large eastern companies relied 
on the same type of mortgage company connections that had been developed 
by  the Connecticut insurance firms before  1900 (Woodruff 1937, 7-15).  As 
before,  these mortgage  companies screened applications from local agents, 
made loans out of their own funds, and then sent the loans to the life insurance 
company for approval. Just like their nineteenth-century  counterparts, more- 
over, these correspondents were paid by  commission and a share of  interest 
payments, and accepted the “effort risk” associated with enforcing outstand- 
ing loans. 
Woodruff (1937,9) attributes the widespread use of correspondents during 
the 1910s and 1920s to two refinements made to the system that the Connecti- 
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firms chose to establish exclusive relationships with mortgage companies simi- 
lar to those that Aetna had developed in the 1880s and 1890s. In fact, the life 
insurance-mortgage  company  connections  of the  1920s were so strong that 
fully 88 percent of all the farm mortgages originated by mortgage companies 
were purchased by their insurance company partners. A second refinement was 
the “right of reinspection,” which was a more limited version of the guarantee 
that mortgage companies had offered individual investors during the late nine- 
teenth century. Under these agreements the insurance company  could return 
a mortgage to the correspondent if  it performed poorly  during its first year. 
Once the year had passed, however, the company was obliged to retain  non- 
performing  loans, even though  the  correspondent  remained  responsible for 
enforcing them. 
The expansion  of  the  life  insurance-mortgage  company connection  suc- 
ceeded in mobilizing substantial flows of  interregional farm mortgage credit 
between  1910 and  1930. But the viability of  a loan agency network, whether 
internal or external to an intermediary, continued to depend on a constant flow 
of new loans and commission income. So the insurance companies, just like 
the  western  mortgage  companies  in  the  late  188Os,  came  under  pressure 
to approve loans that they knew were marginal. The development of  the life 
insurance-mortgage  company  connection  did  not  eliminate the  pressure  to 
overlend in interregional markets; therefore, it simply transferred the pressure 
through the mortgage companies to their exclusive partners. 
Northwestern came under pressure to overlend even though  it supervised 
loan agents through branch  offices (Williamson  and Smalley  1957, 179-81, 
210-15).  As early as 1912 its president became concerned about the quality of 
loans because farm property values had already doubled from 1900 levels. His 
proposal to discontinue farm-lending operations was overruled by the Finance 
Committee,  however, because  its  members  believed  that  outstanding  loans 
could not be adequately  serviced if  the branch offices  were closed  and the 
company’s relationships with loan agents disrupted. In the following year the 
volume of loan applications began to run far ahead of the company’s mortgage 
portfolio requirements, and it was forced to institute quotas to spread commis- 
sions evenly among its loan agents. Pressure from the field then increased over 
lending terms as well as volume. Northwestern’s agents had difficulty attracting 
borrowers because the company adhered to its strict policy of making loans 
for no more than 40 percent of conservatively valued farmland, while the repre- 
sentatives of other lenders offered lending terms based on more liberal apprais- 
als. Northwestern chose to meet the competition by lowering its lending rates, 
but by 1923 the company was actually making small losses on new mortgages 
net of commissions and service charges. The company finally abandoned its 
new farm loan program in 1925. 
Northwestern came under pressure to overlend because of the activities of 
its large eastern competitors. These companies relaxed lending standards to 
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heir farm loan operations. Metropolitan, for example, instructed its correspon- 
dents to lend no more than  $62.50 per acre on Iowa farmland in  1917, but 
aised the loan ceiling to $75 in 1918, and to $100 in  1919 (James 1947, 236- 
37). In doing so, the company was forced to ratify a two-year permanent capital 
gain of 60 percent on farmland to maintain its burgeoning lending network in 
that state. Under these conditions it was hardly surprising that the volume of 
loan applications submitted to the company increased rapidly in  1919, or that 
the company’s $20 million annual allotment for farm loans was exhausted by 
9 April of the following year. 
Metropolitan was not alone in  its actions, for the pressure to overlend was 
felt industrywide and intensified over time. In Story County, Iowa, the debt per 
acre for all mortgages made by  insurance companies increased from $38 to 
$84 between  1910 and  1920 (Murray  1938). The companies appear to have 
maintained loan quality, because the appraised value of an acre in this county 
increased from $130 to $289 during the same period. Despi.te maintaining the 
appearance of a constant 30 percent loan-to-value ratio, however, the compa- 
nies were almost certainly aware that land appraisals were being systematically 
inflated by correspondents in the field.*O After 1920 the evidence of overlend- 
ing in Story is much clearer; land prices fell to $150 in 1925, while the debt 
per acre on mortgage loans fell only to $77. This sharp jump in the average 
loan-to-value ratio occurred just as the  insurance companies expanded their 
Iowa mortgage portfolios by  $1 83 million and replaced the commercial bank- 
ing system as the most important source of farm mortgage credit in the state. 
Archibald Woodruff, whose father served as the chief of farm mortgage opera- 
tions for Prudential, remains the authority on the lending practices of the life 
insurance companies  during  the  period.  His observations  leave little doubt 
about the link between the aggressive expansion of the industry’s interregional 
lending networks and “overlending”: “More serious was the disposition of the 
correspondent to emphasize the quantity of new business at the expense of 
quality. The income of  the correspondent was derived chiefly from commis- 
sions on new loans so that the desire of the correspondent was to get through 
as many loans as possible. . . .  The life companies had no trouble with the class 
of loans the correspondents had sent in up to 1910, [but] they were too free in 
accepting some of the loans sent in after that year, particularly during 1920 and 
1921” (1937, 13). 
The evidence of  overlending  drawn from Iowa is particularly compelling 
because the life insurance-mortgage  company connection had its greatest im- 
pact in this state. Between  1910 and  1920 total farm mortgage debt in Iowa 
increased by  176 percent and land values by  136 percent-magnitudes  twice 
as large as in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois over the same period. Jones and Dur- 
20. I should point out that Murray (1938) argues that the reasons for the Iowa land boom during 
the 1920s was the use of  second mortgages, and that the first mortgages made by  life insurance 
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and (1954, 81) were led to conclude that “the causes of the Iowa land boom 
are difficult to explain,” but these authors failed to connect the episode to the 
prominent role that insurance companies and their agents played in the state. 
In  fact, 25 percent of the farm mortgages made by all insurance companies 
between  1910 and  1920 were on Iowa land, and by  1930 the industry was 
supplying more than 40 percent of the state’s total farm mortgage debt (Jones 
and  Durand  1954, 41).21  More than  a decade later the Temporary  National 
Economic  Committee  concluded  that  “[iln  Iowa  . . . many  [life insurance] 
companies lent amounts on farm properties in excess of their true values,” and 
blamed  the  practice  of  using  correspondents  that  were  paid  commissions 
(1940b, 349).** 
Even though the life insurance-mortgage  company connection of the 1920s 
proved to be susceptible to overlending during the 1910s and 1920s, it contin- 
ued to dominate the interregional mortgage market well into the post-World 
War  I1 era. The reason, of course, was that insurance companies were able to 
absorb the costs of  enforcing outstanding mortgage contracts after the farm 
mortgage lending boom ended in the 1920s, and rates of delinquency and de- 
fault soon reached very high levels. The insurance companies assumed these 
responsibilities as their correspondent networks began to break down in the 
early 1930s (Woodruff 1937,78-79;  Saulnier 1950,3  1-3  1). At first, insurance 
companies released correspondents from the obligation to take over bad loans 
under the right of reinspection. With new lending at a standstill, however, mort- 
gage companies and loan agents were receiving no commissions to compen- 
sate them for enforcing outstanding loans. The insurance companies remained 
reluctant to disband their lending networks even at this point and began to pay 
management fees to their correspondents. But under this arrangement there 
was little difference between a correspondent and a salaried employee of the 
company, so this stopgap measure was quickly abandoned and the correspon- 
dents discharged. By the mid-1930s all of the major insurance companies had 
been forced to internally manage their remaining farm mortgage portfolios as 
well as the real estate that had been acquired through foreclosure. 
These enforcement activities grew to staggering proportions. The industry’s 
farm mortgage portfolio decreased from its peak of $2.2 billion in 1929 to $0.9 
billion in  1938, and by  then the companies owned more than $0.6 billion of 
farmland (Temporary National Economic Commission 1940a, 174-84). All of 
the large companies established  internal operations  to enforce  the terms of 
defaulted loans and to undertake the costly enforcement tasks that were enu- 
21. Recall from note 19 above that the federal land banks and joint-stock mortgage banks were 
much less active in the west North Central regions than the life insurance companies were. 
22. In Iowa, defaults reached epidemic proportions by  1930, and during the 1930s insurance 
companies initiated two-thirds of the foreclosures in the state although they held only 40 percent 
of the mortgage debt. The companies could not quickly liquidate so much property and as late as 
1939 still owned 8 percent of the farmland in Iowa (Temporary National Economics Commission 
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merated in section 7.2; they worked with delinquents to reschedule loan pay- 
ments and prevent foreclosure, supervised defaulters who chose to remain on 
the land as tenants, and made substantial investments to improve, rent, and sell 
abandoned farms.23  The companies received some relief when 30 percent of 
their loans in Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, and Tennessee were extinguished 
through an emergency mortgage program operated by  the federal land bank 
commissioner. But even with this “bailout” of $0.3 billion the companies were 
forced to undertake mortgage enforcement activities on a monumental scale 
(Temporary National Economic Commission 1940b, 347). 
Those companies that had expanded their lending activities most aggres- 
sively during  the  1910s and  1920s were  more seriously  affected.  Because 
Northwestern maintained stringent loan standards during the 1910s and sus- 
pended new farm lending completely in the early 1920s, it acquired property 
on only  14 percent of  its farm mortgage portfolio (Williamson and Smalley 
1957, 261-65).  In contrast, 49 percent of Equitable’s loans went into “serious 
default,” and the company eventually acquired 5,035 farms and did not sell off 
the last of these properties until 1947. At its peak in  1938 the company’s Farm 
Real Estate Division employed a force of four hundred men to make repairs on 
2,800 farms at an average cost of $1,100 (Skogvold 1956, 114-19).  Prudential 
established its Foreclosure and Property Section in 1928, and shortly thereafter 
one of the company’s officers described the operation as the “stepchild who 
wandered in and couldn’t find its way out” (May and Oursler 1950, 206). His 
comment was  both incisive and prescient,  as the company acquired 46,159 
farms by  1939 and was still managing 2,000 of  them in  1945. The largest 
enforcement task fell to Metropolitan’s Department of Agriculture, however, 
which eventually managed  13,290 farms that represented the security on 58 
percent of  the loans it had held in its portfolio (James  1947, 294-305).  By 
1939 Metropolitan  had  become  the  largest  private  property  owner  in  the 
United States because of these operations, as it held land equal in size to a 
farm one mile wide stretching from New York to Los Angeles. 
Despite the  nearly complete dissolution  of  the insurance  industry’s farm 
mortgage lending operations in the 1930s, the companies survived to dominate 
the interregional market for residential mortgage credit in the 1940s and 1950s. 
In fact, the life insurance industry had just begun to make inroads into this line 
of business before the onset of the Great Depression. Metropolitan  was the 
innovator in the field and made its first loans in 1920 through a Kansas City 
banker who sought to finance a suburban housing development. Within three 
years Metropolitan’s 66 residential mortgage loan correspondents were super- 
vising 163 agents in 37 states (James 1947,251). The impact on the company’s 
portfolio was profound. In  1919 it had written four-fifths of  its $272 million 
urban mortgage portfolio on New York property, and only one-third of that on 
23. Woodruff  1937 and Mehr  1944 provide extensive discussions of the farm property opera- 
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residential real estate. Ten years later the company held $1.2 billion in urban 
mortgage loans, and more than 40 percent of the total  had been  written  on 
single-family homes and apartments in out-of-state markets. The rest of the 
industry followed Metropolitan  into the residential business during the  late 
1920s, and insurance companies held some $4.4 billion of residential debt by 
1930, much of it made through loan correspondents. 
There is little direct evidence that overlending affected the industry’s resi- 
dential mortgage business as it had its farm mortgage operations. Nonetheless, 
by  1935 the industry had acquired $1 billion of foreclosed urban property and 
faced an enforcement task equal in scale to its farm operation. At that point 
the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation made nearly $3.1 billion of  mortgages 
to refinance the debt of delinquent residential borrowers (Harris 195  1). It is 
likely that the share going to insurance companies was substantial, because by 
1936 their residential mortgage portfolio had fallen to only $1.5 billion (Saul- 
nier  1950, 2). Soon thereafter  the  insurance industry  began  to  make  inter- 
regional loans on residential real estate that were guaranteed by the new Fed- 
eral Housing Administration (FHA). In fact, the expansion of federal mortgage 
insurance and guarantee programs in the postwar era provided the foundation 
for  the  revival  of  the  life  insurance-mortgage  company  connection  in  the 
1950s. 
7.7  Conclusion 
Between  1870 and  1940 the  cost of  mortgage  credit varied  dramatically 
across regions of the United States. The mortgage rate gradient reflected severe 
imbalances in regional supplies and demands for mortgage finance and per- 
sisted because intermediaries were unable to move enough funds across space 
to equalize lending rates (Snowden 1987, 1988). Lance Davis (1965) argued 
that the national mortgage market remained regionally segmented because “in- 
formation and transactions costs” inhibited the interregional flow of mortgage 
credit. The analysis presented here provides  a more concrete picture of the 
informational forces that were at work. In particular,  I have tried to explain 
how information imperfections destabilized most historical interregional lend- 
ing  structures  in  the  late  nineteenth  century  and  why  the  life  insurance- 
mortgage company connection emerged as the only viable mechanism to inte- 
grate  the  national  mortgage  market  during  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth 
century. 
Several types of lending structures arose in the interregional market before 
1900, and I have interpreted all of  them as hierarchical contractual arrange- 
ments that connected borrowers, loan agents, and investors. Each particular 
contract  in  these  hierarchies  was  structured  to provide  the  better-informed 
party in a bilateral  relationship to faithfully perform certain obligations. Se- 
cured mortgage debt encouraged borrowers to fully repay loans, and commis- 
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contracts for interregional investors. Mortgage companies arose to supervise 
loan agents for investors and established their own credibility by promising to 
absorb all of  the enforcement costs associated with mortgage lending. Each 
of  these contracts makes  sense when  considered  alone, but  in  combination 
they created pressures to issue debt under terms that some participants knew 
were unsafe, led to massive waves of  delinquency and foreclosure, and gen- 
erated  such  large enforcement  costs that  mortgage  companies  were  forced 
to renege on their pledge to enforce loans. By  1900 life insurance companies 
had proven to be the only investors with sufficient resources and institutional 
flexibility to enforce mortgage loans when their mortgage company correspon- 
dents failed. This was the fundamental reason that the life insurance-mortgage 
company  connection  became  the  dominant  interregional  lending  channel 
between 1900 and 1950. 
The final phase in the development of this lending structure occurred during 
the  1950s and has already been explored in several treatments of the postwar 
mortgage market (Behrens  1952; Morton  1956; Klaman  1959, 1961; Colean 
1962). Each of these studies concludes that the nation’s residential mortgage 
market became fully integrated in the  1950s after the insurance industry re- 
established its connections with a new generation of mortgage companies. All 
of them also emphasize that the basis of the restoration was the FHA mortgage 
insurance and Veterans Administration (VA) loan-guarantee programs. Mort- 
gage companies, more than eight hundred in number by the early 1950s, be- 
came FHA- and VA-qualified lenders and originated nearly  all of  the mort- 
gages that entered the interregional market. Life insurance firms became their 
most important clients and lent broadly enough across space through them to 
equalize regional residential mortgage rates. As a result, the national mortgage 
market finally became integrated after eight decades of nearly continuous in- 
novation and experimentation. 
Federal intervention  integrated the mortgage market by eliminating mort- 
gage crises and protecting investors from the major risk associated with inter- 
regional lending. To begin with, FHA and VA  programs ended the practice of 
overlending.  These agencies popularized  the long-term, amortized  loan  and 
ended the widespread use of the short-term mortgage that had to be renewed 
several times. The change  in  contract duration  eliminated  most  borrowers’ 
preference for an overappraisal because modern mortgages are typically nego- 
tiated only when property is being purchased and the borrower derives little 
benefit from an overappraisal at that time. Moreover, loan agents cannot inde- 
pendently  inflate the  appraisal on a federally  underwritten loan because  an 
additional property evaluation must be performed by a disinterested, indepen- 
dent expert. The FHA made overlending even more difficult by implementing 
a system of loan-risk evaluation that considers characteristics of the borrower 
and property other than the loan-to-value ratio (Massey  1939, 2-4).  With the 
incentive and opportunity to overlend eliminated, and the federal agencies pre- 
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in the interregional  mortgage market no longer faced the risks of  having to 
enforce loans made thousands of miles away. 
With the stabilization of the mortgage market, life insurance companies no 
longer enjoyed their intrinsic advantage in the interregional lending field that 
had  led to their dominance in the  first place.  In fact, mutual savings banks 
finally entered the interregional mortgage market in  1950, but they were per- 
mitted to invest only in out-of-state mortgages that were government insured 
or guaranteed. Then, in 1970, all types of institutional investors gained access 
to the interregional market when federal agencies began to securitize pools of 
insured and guaranteed residential mortgage loans and sold them as mortgage- 
backed  securities.  So  the  historical  development  of  the  life  insurance- 
mortgage company connection was intimately connected to the instability of 
the mortgage market. It dominated the interregional mortgage market between 
1900 and 1950 because no other type of investor could survive mortgage cri- 
ses. Since then it has come to play  a more limited role because government 
intervention has eliminated the sources and impacts of these crises. 
Besides identifying the forces that drove the integration of the national mort- 
gage market, this history also demonstrates how informational considerations 
determine the boundaries of the financial firm. Financial innovation often oc- 
curs by the introduction of a single type of intermediary, and we have seen that 
the development of local mortgage lending structures fits this view of the uni- 
fied financial firm quite well. But in other settings, such as the markets for 
interregional mortgages, commercial  paper,  or corporate  securities, new  fi- 
nancial services are produced by combinations of several intermediaries. These 
complex financial structures arise to deal in contracts that are negotiated  and 
enforced under complex technological constraints that prevent any single inter- 
mediary from efficiently producing all of the required financial services. 
In the case examined here independent loan agents negotiated and enforced 
mortgage loans efficiently because they enjoyed a locational advantage. The 
same spatial constraint that protected them from competitors outside of their 
local markets, however, prevented agents from expanding the size of their op- 
erations sufficiently to establish their credibility with investors. Mortgage com- 
panies  arose, therefore,  to monitor  loan agents for distant  investors. These 
firms performed quite well in normal times, but could not be profitably capital- 
ized deeply enough to survive periodic mortgage crises. So life insurance com- 
panies, with no intrinsic advantage in interregional mortgage making, became 
the exclusive partners of mortgage companies because it was efficient for them 
to grow so large in their primary line of business that they were able to absorb 
substantial enforcement costs during a mortgage crisis. I conclude, therefore, 
that the historical development of complex multifirm financial structures like 
the life insurance-mortgage  company connection can be understood only by 
clearly specifying the informational basis of financial contracts and the tech- 
nologies that are used to negotiate and enforce them. 245  The Evolution of Interregional Mortgage Lending Channels, 1870-1940 
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Comment  Timothy W. Guinnane 
One of  the great themes in the economic history  of  the United  States is the 
regional  integration  of markets for both products and factors of  production. 
Market integration permitted the efficient exploitation of this country’s great 
human and material resources. Lance Davis showed long ago, in a justly fa- 
mous paper, that the nineteenth century witnessed  substantial integration in 
the market for capital. Kenneth Snowden’s admirable paper reminds us that 
underlying Davis’s convergence of interest rates were some complicated insti- 
tutional developments. Market integration required the creating and improve- 
ment of mechanisms through which lenders could acquire and use the informa- 
tion they  needed  to move capital  to  the  place  where it was best  rewarded. 
Snowden uses a nice balance of economic intuition and knowledge of institu- 
tional details to explain why interregional mortgage lending evolved in fits and 
starts and why life insurance companies grew to become such important lend- 
ers in that market. 
Snowden’s explanation of the role of life insurance companies in this process 
is, in my view, correct. One task he did not tackle-for  entirely understandable 
reasons, including page constraints-was  to ask why other institutions were 
not tried, or if they were tried, why they were not successful. Life insurance 
companies did become important, but why didn’t other institutions emerge to 
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take the place they eventually filled? At several places in Snowden’s account 
the reader may be reminded of institutions that dealt with similar information 
problems in quite different contexts, or may be led to ask why people did not 
adopt some alterations to their basic arrangements that would seem to provide 
a better incentive structure. My remarks seek to highlight certain features of 
Snowden’s account by restating it in slightly different form, and then to con- 
sider why lenders and borrowers did not find other ways to contend with infor- 
mation problems in interregional mortgage markets. For brevity  I will focus 
on his account of  the development of  the life insurance-mortgage  company 
connection prior to World War I. 
Information and Interregional Mortgage Lending 
At first blush it seems odd to devote so much attention to information prob- 
lems associated with mortgage-based loans. Textbook accounts of the role of 
asymmetric information in credit markets often refer to collateral as one way 
to solve many of the problems associated with asymmetric information. A bor- 
rower who is willing to pledge collateral shows that he intends to repay the 
loan. And once a loan is made, collateral reduces the borrower’s incentive to 
shirk or to invest the loan in risky activities. Consider the loan-to-value ratio 
typical of the mortgages Snowden discusses. If  the land’s value is appraised 
accurately and if the loan is only for one-half (or even less) of the land’s value, 
then a borrower has much to lose through foreclosure. Land, moreover, is usu- 
ally an excellent form of  collateral. A borrower cannot run away with land, 
unlike tools or personal property; land does not bum or die of disease, unlike 
buildings and livestock; land’s condition can be monitored simply by walking 
by the property  in question; and in most legal environments land cannot be 
alienated without a transfer of title that serves to impede fraudulent exchanges. 
The reader (or author) of the textbook  view  of  collateral then,  might be 
somewhat surprised to learn that mortgage lending in the United States evolved 
in fits and starts and eventually prospered only with the backing of the federal 
government. Why? Snowden’s story stems from two distinctive features of the 
U.S. economy at the time, the spatial distribution of population and economic 
activity and the boom-bust cycle of western real estate markets. The demand 
for capital for agriculture and new housing was concentrated most heavily in 
the Midwest and the West. Yet the people of  these regions were unlikely  to 
have funds to lend their neighbors. To match savers with the most lucrative 
outlets for their savings, mortgage lending in the United States in this period 
had to reach across great distances. And here arises the information problem 
central to Snowden’s paper. Much of what makes land desirable as collateral- 
the land is fixed in place, so the borrower cannot run off in the night with his 
farm-means  that to evaluate a property and to supervise a loan, a lender must 
either incur the cost of travel to the farm’s location or employ an agent to do 
so on her behalf. In the nineteenth century the distances required for lenders 
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booms and busts that characterized western real estate markets placed addi- 
tional constraints on solutions to the information problem. Any individual or 
institution that would invest in these real estate markets had to be prepared to 
contend with the recurring general declines in prices. During such busts, many 
borrowers would default on their loans, forcing lenders either to sell the fore- 
closed property at depressed prices or to try to manage the property  from a 
distance. To the extent lenders did not fully anticipate declines in real estate 
prices (and many did not),  some institutional arrangements  that functioned 
well in times of stable or even increasing land prices collapsed during price 
declines. The combination of information problems and fluctuating real estate 
prices meant that many conventional forms of financial intermediation could 
not facilitate interregional mortgage lending. 
Thus, as Snowden shows, local mortgages in the nineteenth-century United 
States might have solved the textbook’s information problem, but the need for 
interregional lending gave rise to a distinct set of information problems. Be- 
cause it would be costly for lenders to contract directly with borrowers and for 
lenders to monitor the use of loans, lending had to occur through third parties. 
Interregional lending created principal-agent problems that concerned primar- 
ily the lenders and their intermediaries in addition to the textbook focus on 
lenders and their borrowers. The principals (the lenders) had less information 
about the  characteristics  of  the  loans  than  their  agents  (who arranged  the 
loans). The problem faced by borrowers, loan agents, and lenders was to struc- 
ture a set of institutions that could overcome those information barriers without 
incurring costs that would price credit out of the market. 
The problems posed by  long-distance lending are best appreciated by con- 
sidering some of the most successful nineteenth-century institutions for finan- 
cial intermediation. Many  of these institutions have the common  feature of 
restriction to small geographic areas in which members  are likely to know 
each other and to encounter each other in their daily activities. This geographic 
restriction  imposed costs on the institution, including correlation of  the in- 
comes of members, but also allowed the institution to maximize the cheap 
information that came from daily social interactions. Students of US.  financial 
history are familiar with the image of the country banker who knew most of his 
customers and could inspect their fields during Sunday buggy rides. Snowden 
discusses the first building associations, institutions that voluntarily restricted 
themselves to operations  within  a single county. A more dramatic example 
of this principle is the rural credit cooperatives formed in Germany in the sec- 
ond half of the nineteenth century. Most of these cooperatives restricted their 
operations to single small villages.  Because cooperative members had good 
information about one another and could impose some severe, noneconomic 
sanctions on defaulters, cooperatives could make loans other financial interme- 
diaries would not, including loans without collateral. The obvious drawback to 
such arrangements, one that was in part responsible for the rise of “national” 
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not satisfy the demand for loans in the presence of the spatial mismatch be- 
tween the supply of and demand for credit that characterized the United States 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. Germany’s agricultural credit co- 
operatives relied primarily on local savings and made only local loans. Clearly 
the basis upon  which they  were organized  would  have required  substantial 
modification for them to succeed at interregional lending.’ 
Whatever the mechanism employed  for making interregional  loans, to be 
successful it must involve some way to structure the relationship between the 
lender and her agent such that the agent does not take advantage of his superior 
information.  This  problem  is  common  to many  situations  involving  long- 
distance economic transactions. Recently economic historians have argued that 
some institutional arrangements amount to systems whereby an agent or group 
of agents commits not to take advantage of an informational or power asymme- 
try.  A  commitment  mechanism  amounts  to  an  arrangement  that  alters  the 
agent’s incentives: he can be trusted not to cheat because, once he is part of the 
commitment mechanism, it is not in his interest to do  SO.^ This is not the only 
way to structure such an arrangement, nor is there universal agreement about 
the role of commitment mechanisms in economic history. Another way to solve 
the  principal-agent  problem  would  be  for principals  to rely  exclusively  on 
people they could trust, such as family members or members of the same eth- 
nic or religious group. If the agent fears punishment by God if he takes advan- 
tage of his superior information to cheat the principal, then the principal can 
trust the agent even in the absence of any commitment structure. Family con- 
nections function in an analogous way; presumably most of us are less willing 
to cheat a family member because we fear alienation from family members 
more than alienation from others. Snowden focuses on why a satisfactory com- 
mitment mechanism did not emerge and survive in the United States. Agents 
found ways to effectively  commit themselves not to cheat lenders, but these 
arrangements could not survive the booms and busts of the real estate market. 
Agents, Mortgage Companies, and Life Insurance Companies 
The first widespread interregional lending took the form of individual loan 
agents in the Midwest and West, acting on behalf of individual lenders else- 
where. Although working through a loan agent might have been preferable to 
trying to conduct all business in person, this structure gave the agent consider- 
able latitude to exploit  his  superior information. The agent’s income was a 
1. Guinnane (1994) discusses the unsuccessful attempt to introduce the German model into 
Ireland in the 1890s, and contains details on the structure and organization of the German coopera- 
tives. The German agricultural credit cooperatives did create a system of “Centrals,” regional co- 
operative banks that accepted deposits from some cooperatives and made loans to  others. But 
these institutions functioned primarily to smooth credit needs over agricultural cycles and over 
bad years; they did not exist to intermediate credit between regions with chronic excess deposits 
and regions with chronic excess demand. 
2. Greif  1989, an analysis of  medieval trading groups, is a recent example of this style of ar- 
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finder’s fee, and all he really had to do was to convince the lender to accept the 
loan. What was there to deter the agent from misrepresenting  properties and 
borrowers to arrange as many loans as possible? The only sanction an individ- 
ual lender could apply to an uncooperative or dishonest agent was to refuse to 
do business with him in the future and to refuse to recommend his services to 
others. Neither sanction meant much so long as the market consisted of many 
individual lenders dealing with many individual agents. Given the volume of 
lending conducted by a single person and the difficulty of establishing an accu- 
rate reputation  in the fluid societies in question, neither the threat of  losing 
future business  nor the potential  damage to the agent’s reputation  was very 
costly. The only commitment the agent could make not to take advantage of 
his superior information would be to agree to take back any loan at any time, 
in essence saying that he had confidence in any loan he passed through to a 
lender. Given the small size of his own portfolio, however, he simply could not 
commit to hold the entire stock of outstanding loans he had arranged. If land 
prices fell too much, his portfolio would become worthless. 
Mortgage  companies had  several advantages over individual loan agents. 
Snowden rightly emphasizes gains from volume and standardization of prac- 
tices. For lenders, the great volume of loans meant that their funds were less 
likely to lay idle waiting for a borrower. More importantly, perhaps, mortgage 
companies could make commitments to lenders that individual agents could 
not. Their size and relative  permanence meant that  the sanctions  of  loss of 
future business and damage to reputation were effective deterrents to dishonest 
behavior.  Mortgage companies, moreover,  could  attempt the  more effective 
commitment mentioned above, to take back any loan. This policy worked for 
a while because mortgage companies were sufficiently large that a small num- 
ber of bad loans would  not overwhelm their portfolios.  Yet  when a general 
decline in land values occurred in the late 1880s and 1890s, this commitment 
could not be honored. Mortgage companies were simply incapable of holding 
all the bad loans in their portfolios. 
Snowden  argues  that  life  insurance  companies-which  in  most  cases 
worked through mortgage companies of the sort that had failed in the 1880s 
and 1890s-succeeded  in this market for two related reasons. First, insurance 
companies were large enough to develop specialized departments to manage 
property. The costs of enforcing a bad loan were thus lower, because the insur- 
ance company could hire and train its own staff to supervise the property  it 
held. Second, the life insurance  companies did not issue demand liabilities, 
and so had relatively  small need for liquidity. Life insurance company port- 
folios were so large and diversified  that they could afford to take over and 
manage properties  that  came their  way  via foreclosures,  even  in  a general 
downturn in prices. Although convenient for a real estate investor in any situa- 
tion, this trait was particularly valuable during general downturns in land prices 
because the insurance company could simply sit things out and wait to sell its 
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Some Why Nots 
Snowden’s account is a convincing explanation of why life insurance compa- 
nies came to play a dominant role in interregional lending in the United States 
in the nineteenth century. He places rather more stress on explaining why life 
insurance companies  succeeded  than  on explaining  why  other possible  ar- 
rangements did not succeed. This is a sensible approach; one can hardly con- 
sider and discard every possible institutional arrangement. Yet his account sug- 
gests several arrangements sometimes used in other circumstances, and it is 
useful to ask why they were not employed in the United States. 
The first question concerns the contract between the individual agents and 
the individual lenders. (Much the same questions can be asked about the mort- 
gage companies, as well.) Snowden notes that the agent was paid a finder’s fee, 
giving the agent no incentive beyond concern for repeat business or his reputa- 
tion to refrain from passing through bad loans or to provide any services to the 
lender in managing a foreclosed property. Why would lenders agree to this sort 
of scheme? One could imagine two modifications  that would provide better 
incentives for the agent. First, lenders could offer a different way  to pay the 
agent. One could imagine, for example, a system that paid the agent’s fee only 
when a loan was successfully paid off. This system would require agents to 
forgo a certain finder’s fee now in return for a more uncertain income later. But 
lenders and their agents might find it in their mutual interest to increase the fee 
to compensate the agent for waiting and for bearing some of the default risk. 
Second, lenders could use as their agents only individuals who had some other 
tie to a community and some other reputation to protect. Lawyers or bankers 
might  seem  natural  candidates,  especially  since  many  could  treat  their 
mortgage-agent business as a natural adjunct to their main line of work. Snow- 
den  mentions  that  the  Davenport  family  preferred  to use  lawyers  as  their 
agents, but does not pursue the point beyond that. 
The success of the Davenport family raises another set of questions. Snow- 
den notes that this family made some $4 million in loans in a thirty-year period, 
relying on a network of agents that the family selected and trained. The organi- 
zation of economic activity through families is not uncommon and, as noted 
above, has particular advantages when long distances make information diffi- 
cult to obtain and use. Yet the use of family members could not obviate all the 
difficulties Snowden identifies. Some additional detail on this family’s opera- 
tions could provide useful insights into the principal-agent problem more gen- 
erally. For example, Snowden notes that, in the face of declining demand for 
loans, mortgage companies faced the choice of losing their trained agents or 
knowingly  accepting low-quality loans. How did the Davenports  keep their 
trained agents under these conditions? What did the Davenports do in the face 
of general downturns in land prices? Were their liquidity needs so slight that 
they could hold large numbers of foreclosed mortgages in their family port- 
folio? One also wonders why families such as the Davenports did not expand 
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trained agents to make loans for others. The Davenports and families like them, 
one would think, could easily increase their profits by using their eastern neigh- 
bors’ funds and their own midwestern agents to achieve the economies of scale 
in investigation and monitoring that Snowden attributes to the mortgage com- 
panies. The Davenports  could have dealt with  the  commitment problem by 
showing that their family fortune was invested in the activities in which they 
expected others to invest. 
Snowden’s account of the Davenports  also raises questions about another 
form of interregional organization. Many of the people who needed capital in 
the West and Midwest must have had relatives themselves back east, relatives 
who could either lend the required money personally or function as intermedi- 
ary  for friends and neighbors  who wanted to invest in  western  mortgages. 
These isolated, informal  arrangements  are of  course quite difficult  to track 
down in historical sources, but it would be interesting to know whether there 
is mention of them. 
This brings us to a final option, and perhaps the most natural one to consider: 
full-fledged mortgage banks. Snowden notes that some mortgage companies 
began to issue bonds in the 1880s and  1890s, becoming, in a real sense, true 
financial intermediaries. By issuing bonds the mortgage companies came to 
resemble the mortgage banks common in Europe at the time. Following this 
suggestion and the logic of Snowden’s own argument about the life insurance 
companies lead us to wonder just why the bond-issuing  mortgage company 
would not be a superior interregional lender. Note first that a company that 
issues bonds to finance the mortgage loans it makes faces no principal-agent 
problem; it is both principal and agent.3 Second, by issuing bonds of the right 
terms and maturity, the mortgage  company could be just as happy  holding 
property in its portfolio as the insurance company; liquidity problems are most 
severe for individuals and for institutions (such as banks) that issue demand 
liabilities. Finally, rather than setting up a separate unit to manage properties, 
the mortgage company could make property management a part of  its more 
general business of  gathering and using information on borrowers and their 
collateral. 
The answer to my question may lie in regulatory restrictions on financial 
intermediaries. Clearly the institution we are imagining could run afoul of pro- 
hibitions on interstate banking, branch banking, or both, although one could 
imagine that those who stood to profit from organizing and running such an 
institution  could  lobby  the  Congress  and  state  legislatures  for appropriate 
changes in the law. More salient is the difficulty  of  issuing bonds with the 
right terms.  Snowden identifies liquidity as the central shortcoming of  both 
individual agents and the mortgage companies. To be successful our hypotheti- 
cal mortgage bank would have to be able to hold nonperforming loans in its 
3. Agency problems remain  wirhin the firm, of  course, but both Snowden and I are ignoring 
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portfolio long enough to ride out depressions  in real estate markets. This in 
turn  would  entail the  issuance  of  long-term  liabilities.  Could the  mortgage 
bank in fact market long-term  liabilities? Perhaps not. Short-term  liabilities 
have long been a feature of banking institutions, even in circumstances where 
the assets had fairly long maturities and the mismatch between the two sets of 
maturities could lead to bank runs and other costly incidents. This mismatch 
is not  an unfortunate  product  of  custom.  Calomiris  and Kahn  (1991) have 
shown that short-term liabilities function as an important policing device: be- 
cause bank managers know more about the bank’s portfolio than its depositors, 
one way for bank managers to commit not to capitalize on their superior infor- 
mation by absconding with the funds is to stand willing to refund deposits at 
any time. Lamoreaux (1991) refers to a similar principle in her study of New 
England  banking in the nineteenth  century.  A mortgage  banking  institution 
might have found it very difficult to raise funds. European mortgage banks, in 
fact, usually borrowed money on public capital markets, but were based on 
governmental guarantees and often hefty government subsidies. 
More compelling, however, is Snowden’s argument that full-fledged mort- 
gage banks would have been superfluous at the time of the life insurance com- 
pany’s dominance of the interregional mortgage market. By the end of the nine- 
teenth century, when most states had removed their restrictions on insurance 
companies’ investing out of state, the United States had in life insurance com- 
panies what amounted to de fucto mortgage banks. Life insurance companies 
issued liabilities  (insurance  contracts) with  long and actuarially  predictable 
maturities and invested considerable  portions of  the funds raised this way  in 
interregional mortgage lending. Because the life insurance companies did not 
need  liquidity,  they  could ride  out the recurring  depressions  in  real  estate 
prices. As Snowden emphasizes, the life insurance companies had their own 
difficulties in the interregional mortgage markets, including continuing prob- 
lems with the mortgage companies. Yet for a period the life insurance compa- 
nies were able to play a role that no previous financial intermediary had been 
able to play. Life insurance companies grew to play the role filled by mortgage 
banks in European countries, and so serve as yet another example of a distinc- 
tively American financial innovation that arose to overcome constraints put in 
place by our banking system. 
References 
Calomiris, Charles, and Charles  M. Kahn. 1991. The Role of  Demandable Debt  in 
Structuring  Optimal Banking Arrangements. American Economic Review  8 1 (3): 
497-513. 
Davis, Lance. 1965. The Investment Market, 1870-1914.  The Evolution of  a National 
Market. Journal of  Economic History 33:355-93. 
Greif, Avner.  1989. Reputation  and Coalitions  in  Medieval  Trade: Evidence on  the 
Maghribi Traders. Journal of  Economic History 49 (4): 857-82. 255  The Evolution of Interregional Mortgage Lending Channels, 1870-1 940 
Guinnane, Timothy W.  1994. A Failed Institutional Transplant: Raiffeisen’s Credit Co- 
operatives in Ireland, 1894-1914. Explorations in Economic History 31 (1): 38-61. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi. 199  1. Information Problems and Banks’ Specialization in Short- 
Term Commercial Lending: New England in the Nineteenth Century. In Inside the 
Business Enterprise: Historical Perspectives on the  Use of  Information, ed. Peter 
Temin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. This Page Intentionally Left Blank